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USING THE MASTER’S “TOOL” TO 
DISMANTLE HIS HOUSE: WHY JUSTICE 
CLARENCE THOMAS MAKES THE CASE FOR 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
Angela Onwuachi-Willig* 
Justice Clarence Thomas, the second black man to sit on the Supreme Court, 
is famous, or rather infamous, for his opposition to affirmative action. His strongest 
critics condemn him for attacking the very preferences that helped him reach the 
Supreme Court. None, however, have considered how Thomas’s life itself may be used 
as a justification for affirmative action. In what ways can the master’s “tool” be used 
to dismantle his house?1 
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    1. This phrase was coined by renowned feminist, Audre Lorde. See AUDRE LORDE, 
SISTER OUTSIDER: ESSAYS & SPEECHES 110–13 (1984). By using the phrase “master’s tool,” I do 
not mean to suggest that Justice Thomas is a puppet of the conservative Right in developing his 
jurisprudence. Indeed, in a prior article, I defend Justice Thomas against criticisms that he is a 
mere clone of Justice Scalia, arguing that his jurisprudence in certain areas is “raced” and is 
rooted in black conservatism, which has a distinct history and foundation from white 
conservatism. See Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Just Another Brother on the SCT?: What Justice 
Clarence Thomas Teaches Us About the Influence of Racial Identity, 90 IOWA L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 57–84, on file with Author). My use of the term “tool” 
instead applies to the way Republican administrations have seemingly used Thomas, because of 
his race, to advance their political goals, while simultaneously opposing affirmative action and 
then viewing Thomas as “the epitome of the right kind of affirmative action working the right 
way.” Kevin Merida & Michael A. Fletcher, Supreme Discomfort, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 2002, 
at 24. 
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This Article analyzes Justice Thomas’s appointment to the Supreme Court 
and contends that his nomination to and performance on the Court ironically make 
the case for forward-looking affirmative action. Specifically, this Article examines 
various pro-affirmative action arguments, such as the benefit of cross-racial 
understanding through interracial diversity, the destruction of stereotypes through an 
exposure to intraracial diversity of viewpoints, and the redefining of traditional 
standards of merit, and then utilizes such reasoning to explain how Justice Thomas 
himself actually lends support to a continuation of forward-looking affirmative action. 
INTRODUCTION 
Justice Clarence Thomas is well-known for his opposition to affirmative 
action,2 partially because he is a black3 man and such opposition is contrary to the 
views of most Blacks,4 but mostly because he is a black man who is viewed as turning 
his back on a policy that helped him advance to his current standing.5 To Justice 
Thomas, the claim that he has pulled up the ladder of affirmative action after climbing 
                                                                                                                                      
    2. By “affirmative action” I refer to the act of considering the race of 
underrepresented racial minorities as a plus factor in hiring and recruitment and of broadening 
standards of merit that are used to select persons for positions or programs. See Martha S. 
West, The Historical Roots of Affirmative Action, 10 LA RAZA L.J. 607, 614 (1998) (describing 
affirmative action as a “program or policy where race, national origin, or gender is taken into 
account”); see also Anupam Chander, Minorities, Shareholders, and Otherwise, 113 YALE L.J. 
119, 120 n.3 (2003). This Article draws upon case law and articles concerning affirmative 
action in employment and education and focuses solely on “forward-looking” affirmative 
action, not remedial affirmative action, which is designed to remedy past discrimination by a 
school or employer. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Revival of Forward-Looking Affirmative Action, 
104 COLUM. L. REV. 60, 70–74 (2004) (analyzing and defending forward-looking justifications 
for affirmative action); Sarah Stroud, The Aim of Affirmative Action, 25 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 
385, 386 (1999) (asserting that the aim of affirmative action should be viewed as the “forward-
looking” goal of eliminating “unwarranted attitudes that impede rational deliberation about 
career choices and aspirations and thereby keep people from achieving their full potential”). 
    3. Throughout this Article, I capitalize the word “Black” or “White” when used as 
a noun to describe a racialized group. Also, I prefer to use the term “Blacks” rather than the 
term “African-Americans” because the term “Blacks” is more inclusive. Additionally, “[i]t is 
more convenient to invoke the terminological differentiation between black and white than say, 
between African-American and Northern European-American, which would be necessary to 
maintain semantic symmetry between the two typologies.” Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Defending the 
Use of Quotas in Affirmative Action: Attacking Racism in the Nineties, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1043, 1073 n.4 (1992).  
    4. See Poll: Public Split on Affirmative Action, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 7, 2003 
(stating that eighty-nine percent of Blacks still think affirmative action programs are 
necessary). 
    5. See Eugene Volokh, Judging Clarence Thomas, GLENNREYNOLDS.COM, June 30, 
2002 (stating that “[l]ots of people have criticized Justice Clarence Thomas’ anti-race-
preferences opinion [in Grutter] . . . on the grounds that there’s reason to think that he has 
benefited from some such preferences”), at http://frontpagemag.com/articles/readarticle. 
asp?ID=8646; see also Maureen Dowd, Editorial, Where Would Thomas Be Without 
Affirmative Action?, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, June 26, 2003, at B7 (asserting that 
Thomas “could not make a powerful legal argument against racial preferences, given the fact 
that he got into Yale Law School and got picked for the Supreme Court thanks to his race”). 
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it is unfounded because he has not been a beneficiary of the policy.6 Justice Thomas’s 
supporters, such as Thomas Sowell, his mentor and a black senior fellow at the 
Hoover Institute, agree, contending that affirmative action had not started at the time 
that Thomas enrolled at Holy Cross College in Massachusetts and that no one has 
proved that racial preferences played any role in Thomas’s admission to Yale Law 
School.7 
Thomas’s critics, however, vehemently contest these assertions, insisting that 
a long line of facts prove that he has repeatedly benefited from racial preferences.8 
According to these critics, Thomas benefited from racial preferences when he received 
a scholarship to attend Holy Cross,9 when he received admission to Yale Law 
School,10 and when he was appointed by President Ronald Reagan (despite 
purposefully directing his career outside of civil rights and into areas such as tax 
                                                                                                                                      
    6. See Justice Clarence Thomas, A Classic Example of an Affirmative Action Baby, 
J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 31, 1998, at 35 [hereinafter Classic Example] (stating that 
Justice Thomas has repeatedly denied being a beneficiary of affirmative action). In an 
interview in the late 1980s, Thomas asserted, “This thing about how they let me into Yale—
that kind of stuff offends me. All they did was stop stopping us.” Juan Williams, A Question of 
Fairness, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 1, 1987, at 75. Thomas has also denied that race played a 
role in his nomination to the Court. See JOHN GREENYA, SILENT JUSTICE: THE CLARENCE 
THOMAS STORY 171 (2001) (noting that when Thomas was asked for his response to critics who 
claimed that his seat on the Court was a result of a racial preference, “Thomas replied, ‘I think 
a lot worse things have been said. I disagree with that, but I’ll have to live with it’”). But see 
Classic Example, supra, at 36 (reporting that Thomas, whom the author asserts has engaged in 
“revisionist” history, once stated in remarks to staff at the EEOC in 1983, “‘[b]ut for 
[affirmative action programs], God only knows where I would be today’”). 
    7. Classic Example, supra note 6, at 35.  
    8. See, e.g., id. at 35–36. The irony in such assertions by Thomas’s critics, many of 
whom are liberal, is that their comments are often made as insults, despite the fact that the 
politically liberal position on affirmative action, unlike the conservative position, is that 
affirmative action beneficiaries fully deserve the benefits they are awarded. Cf. Robyn E. 
Blumner, Justice Thomas’s Dissent, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June 29, 2003, at 7D (“[Clarence] 
Thomas’s critics may snigger that he is sitting comfortably in one of the most powerful seats in 
government, trying to tell everyone else to make it on merit. But this attitude only proves 
Thomas right.”). 
    9. See GREENYA, supra note 6, at 54 (stating that in the late 1960s, Holy Cross 
“pushed to find and admit more black students under a relatively new policy known as 
affirmative action”); ANDREW PEYTON THOMAS, CLARENCE THOMAS: A BIOGRAPHY 109 (2001) 
(noting that clergy established a Martin Luther King scholarship fund days after Martin Luther 
King, Jr.’s death to recruit students from inner city high schools). In fact, John E. Brooks, who 
was President of the College of Holy Cross during Thomas’s tenure at the school, has 
maintained that Thomas was “‘[c]ertainly’” a beneficiary of affirmative action in admission to 
the college. Classic Example, supra note 6, at 35.  
  10. Classic Example, supra note 6, at 36 (reporting that James Thomas, an 
admissions officer at Yale Law School when Thomas applied in 1971, “has stated that ‘it’s 
pretty clear’ that [Thomas] benefited from affirmative action during the admissions process”); 
see also SCOTT D. GERBER, FIRST PRINCIPLES: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF CLARENCE THOMAS 12 
(1999) (asserting that Thomas was admitted under Yale Law School’s affirmative action plan 
to recruit qualified minorities). 
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law)11 to be the Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Department of Education and later 
Chairperson of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”),12 both 
agencies dedicated to protecting the civil rights of citizens.13 Moreover, there was that 
embarrassing moment upon Thomas’s confirmation to a second term as Chairman of 
the EEOC, when the Republican Assistant Attorney General Bradford Reynolds 
toasted Thomas as “the epitome of the right kind of affirmative action working the 
right way.”14 
Above all of these positions, however, Thomas’s appointment to the U.S. 
Supreme Court by the first President Bush in 1991 was the most controversial.15 
                                                                                                                                      
  11. See Scott D. Gerber, Justice Clarence Thomas and the Jurisprudence of Race, 
25 S.U. L. REV. 43, 43 (1997) (describing Thomas’s desire to avoid any stigma associated with 
race); Christopher Edley Jr., Doubting Thomas: Law, Politics and Hypocrisy, WASH. POST, July 
7, 1991, at B1 (describing Thomas’s statement that he focused on corporate matters so he 
would “not be ‘typed’ . . . [as] a civil rights specialist”). 
  12. While not labeling these appointments as the result of affirmative action, 
Thomas has conceded that race played a role in his appointments as Assistant Secretary for the 
Department of Education and Chairperson for the EEOC. See THOMAS, supra note 9, at 186. 
Prior to these appointments, Thomas had stated, “‘If I ever went to work for the EEOC or did 
anything directly connected with blacks, my career would be irreparably ruined. The monkey 
would be on my back to prove that I didn’t have the job because I’m black. People meeting me 
for the first time would automatically dismiss my thinking as second-rate.’” Williams, supra 
note 6, at 75. After accepting his jobs at the EEOC and the Department of Education, Thomas 
explained his rationale for taking the positions, stating: 
When I was asked to go to the Department of Education as well as come 
here [the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission], you’re dang right I 
was insulted. What other reasons besides the fact that I was black? But 
then I had to ask myself, if you don’t do it, what are you going to say about 
these issues in the future? If you had an opportunity to get in there and you 
didn’t do it, what standing do you have to complain? As one friend put it to 
me, “Clarence, put up or shut up.” And I wasn’t going to shut up. 
THOMAS, supra note 9, at 186 (emphasis added). In 2000, Justice Thomas advised Brian Jones, 
a rising black star in the Republican Party, not to accept a position as assistant attorney general 
for civil rights because “[i]t was a black job.” Kevin Merida & Michael A. Fletcher, Narrowly 
Defined Image Belies Jurist’s Quiet Clout, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 2004, at A1. 
  13. See Merida & Fletcher, supra note 1. 
  14. Williams, supra note 6, at 82 (describing Thomas’s reaction to Reynolds’s 
statement as hurt and disgusted); see also GREENYA, supra note 6, at 127; Merida & Fletcher, 
supra note 1. 
  15. See Victoria Benning, Thomas Hearings’ Ripples Felt in Omaha for Blacks, the 
Issues Reach Beyond Harassment, Race, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Oct. 17, 1991, at 1 (stating 
that the “vote was narrower than any margin for a confirmed high court justice in more than a 
century”). The most interesting rift over Thomas’s nomination was within the black 
community. See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Justice Clarence Thomas in Retrospect, 45 
HASTINGS L.J. 1405, 1407 (1995) (noting that the National Bar Association, the premier 
organization of black lawyers, was divided on Thomas’s nomination—128 opposed, 124 
supported, and thirty-one took no position). Although traditional civil rights groups, such as the 
NAACP, opposed Thomas’s appointment to the bench, polls showed that anywhere from fifty 
percent to seventy percent of Blacks supported Thomas’s nomination. See Peggy Peterman, 
Most Blacks Glad Thomas Confirmed, Now Want Him to Change, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 
17, 1991, at 13A (“[M]ore [black people] were for Clarence Thomas than were against him, but 
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Despite former President Bush’s declaration that Thomas’s race played no role in his 
nomination,16 many viewed race as the ultimate explanation for Thomas’s 
appointment to the Supreme Court.17 For example, at the time of Thomas’s 
appointment, Democratic Senator Joseph Biden stated, “‘Had Thomas been white, he 
never would have been nominated. The only reason he is on the Court is because he is 
black.’”18 In all, Thomas’s critics viewed him as unqualified for the job,19 or at best, 
minimally qualified for the job.20 
                                                                                                                                      
it’s close. . . . [A] sizable number of black people say they simply want an African-American 
on the U.S. Supreme Court. If it’s got to be a tarnished Clarence Thomas, so be it. That’s what 
happens when it takes so long for a group of people, such as African-Americans, to get 
recognition.”); see also THOMAS supra note 9, at 352 (noting that in July 1991, fifty-seven 
percent of Blacks favored Thomas’s nomination, a higher percentage than of Whites); 
Editorial, No Longer Invisible, WALL ST. J. EUR., Oct. 28, 1991, at 6 (noting that between sixty 
percent to seventy percent of Blacks supported Thomas’s confirmation). While some Blacks 
feared Bush’s replacement candidate if Thomas did not succeed, others held out hope that 
“Thomas ultimately would prove himself committed to the advancement of civil rights in his 
decision-making on the Court.” Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role 
Models and Public Confidence, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 405, 483 (2000). 
  16. President George H.W. Bush proclaimed, “The fact that [Thomas] is black and a 
minority had nothing to do with this in the sense that he is the best qualified at this time.” 
THOMAS, supra note 9, at 346; see also JANE MAYER & JILL ABRAMSON, STRANGE JUSTICE: THE 
SELLING OF CLARENCE THOMAS 21 (1994). But see GREENYA, supra note 6, at 171 (stating that 
President Bush was supposed to refer to Judge Thomas as the “best man” for the job instead of 
the “best qualified”).  
  17. See Edley, supra note 11 (“Those who oppose affirmative action . . . should 
oppose the Thomas nomination, because only color can account for his selection.”); cf. 
Manning Marable, Clarence Thomas and the Crisis of Black Political Culture, in RACE-ING 
JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 61, 64 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992) (“At best, Thomas’s 
published writings revealed the working of a mediocre mind.”); Edward Lazarus, Making Sense 
of Thomas’ Cross Burning Remarks and First Amendment Law, FINDLAW, Dec. 26, 2002 
(noting “that Thomas’s qualifications, compared to those of other potential candidates, were 
limited”), at www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/12/26/findlaw.analysis.lazarus.thomas. Many of 
Thomas’s critics contend that his appointment to the bench was due to the combination of his 
race and his conservative politics. See generally Gerber, supra note 11 (discussing how 
Thomas’s critics perceived him). 
  18. Classic Example, supra note 6, at 36.  
  19. Professor Cornel West of Princeton University summed up many of the critiques 
of those who opposed Thomas when he argued the following about Thomas’s qualifications: 
“The fact that Thomas was simply unqualified for the Court—a claim warranted by his 
undistinguished record as a student (mere graduation from Yale Law School does not qualify 
one for the Supreme Court!); his turbulent eight years at the EEOC, where he left thirteen 
thousand age-discrimination cases dying on the vine for lack of investigation; and his mediocre 
performance during a short fifteen months as an appellate court judge—was not even 
mentioned” in opposition to Thomas’s nomination. Cornel West, Black Leadership and the 
Pitfalls of Racial Reasoning, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA 
HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 390–91 (Toni Morrison 
ed., 1992).  
  20. With the exception of George Harris Carswell (a Fourth Circuit Judge with a 
history of supporting segregation), whose confirmation was rejected by the United States 
118 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 47:113 
 
 
Putting Thomas’s qualifications for the bench aside, to say that race played 
no role in his nomination to the Court is disingenuous.21 It would take conscious effort 
to ignore the political pressures on the first President Bush to nominate a black 
candidate to replace Thurgood Marshall, the Court’s first black Justice.22 Additionally, 
although one would be hard pressed to argue that Thomas was unqualified for a seat 
on the Court (especially because there is no required set of qualifications),23 Thomas, 
despite having a very impressive career, arguably had not achieved the same overall 
distinction in his legal career as most other Justices on the bench at the time of his 
appointment.24 For example, though Thomas graduated from the elite Yale Law 
                                                                                                                                      
Senate with a vote of forty-five to fifty-five, Thomas is the only Supreme Court nominee to be 
rated by the American Bar Association (“ABA”) as simply “qualified.” Fax from Denise A. 
Cardman, Senior Legislative Counsel of the ABA, Supreme Court Nominees (May 11, 2004) 
[hereinafter Cardman Fax]. See also Catharine Pierce Wells, Clarence Thomas: The Invisible 
Man, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 117, 121 (1993). Additionally, of all the nominees who were 
ultimately confirmed to the Supreme Court, Justice Thomas is the only one who was not 
unanimously voted as qualified. Twelve reviewers voted for him as “qualified,” two voted for 
him as “not qualified,” one exercised a right of recusal, and none voted for him as “well 
qualified.” Cardman Fax, supra. It is also worth noting that Republicans have argued that the 
ABA committee that evaluates judicial nominees is systematically biased against conservatives. 
Thomas’s age at the time—early forties—also may have affected his rating by the ABA. 
  21. Amicus Briefs in Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger, in Support of the 
University of Michigan: Brief Amici Curiae of Veterans of the Southern Civil Rights Movement 
and Family Members of Murdered Civil Rights Activists, 14 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 89, 98 
(2003) [hereinafter Brief Amici] (“No one can seriously dispute that, when the first President 
Bush selected Justice Clarence Thomas to fill the vacancy left by the retirement of Justice 
Thurgood Marshall, Justice Thomas’s race was a factor—one among many—that President 
Bush considered. No one can seriously contend it was entirely a coincidence that the second 
African American ever to sit on the Supreme Court was selected to fill the vacancy created 
when the first African American Justice retired . . . .”); see also Eva Jefferson Patterson, 
Affirmative Action and the California Civil Wrongs Initiative, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 327, 
336 (1997) (same). 
  22. See THOMAS, supra note 9, at 347 (noting that Edwin Meese, a friend of 
Thomas, conceded that “that the president was influenced somewhat by putting a minority on 
the court[, b]ecause this was Thurgood Marshall’s spot”). 
  23. See WILLIAM D. BADER & ROY M. MERSKY, THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED EIGHT 
JUSTICES 21 (2004) (“There are no established criteria, tests, or guidelines for appointment to 
the Supreme Court.”); Wells, supra note 20, at 119 (noting that “there is little consensus among 
lawyers and scholars as to what should count as qualifications for a Supreme Court 
appointment”). 
  24. See Mark Tushnet, Clarence Thomas’s Black Nationalism, 47 HOW. L.J. 323, 
339 & n.91 (2004) (highlighting that persons have asserted that “Justice Thomas ‘had a 
relatively undistinguished career by Supreme Court standards’” and noting his disagreement 
with that assessment) (quoting Mark A. Graber, Justice Thomas and the Perils of Amateur 
History, in REHNQUIST JUSTICE: UNDERSTANDING THE COURT DYNAMIC 71 (Earl M. Maltz ed., 
2003)). See also Ifill, supra note 15, at 481 (stating that Thomas had not “[d]istinguish[ed] 
himself in . . . the world of big law firm practice [or] academia prior to becoming a judge on the 
District of Columbia Court of Appeals”).  
This is not to say that qualifications that are traditionally considered to constitute high 
distinction in law are necessary to serve as a Supreme Court Justice. Indeed, a significant 
argument in this Article is that traditional standards of merit must be re-parameterized. See 
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School, he did not graduate at the top of his law school class, unlike former Justice 
Byron White, Justice Antonin Scalia, Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Justice Sandra 
Day O’Connor, and Justice John Paul Stevens, who all graduated at the top of their 
respective classes.25 Additionally, unlike many of his colleagues who had clerked for a 
Supreme Court Justice or a federal appellate court judge, Thomas had never clerked 
for a federal judge.26 Similarly, while Thomas had held significant leadership 
positions such as Assistant Secretary of the United States Department of Education 
and Chairperson of the EEOC,27 one could argue that he had not distinguished himself 
as a fierce litigator, astute politician, or prominent scholar, as did some of his 
                                                                                                                                      
discussion infra Part I.C and Conclusion. I borrow from scientists the term “re-parameterize,” 
which means to shift or change the way a complex system is described or understood by 
altering the primary components of a model of the system. See discussion infra Part II.C.; see, 
e.g., Maxwell L. King & Thomas S. Shively, Locally Optimal Testing When a Nuisance 
Parameter Is Present Only Under the Alternative, 75 REV. ECON. & STATS. 1, 1–7 (1993) 
(applying the re-parameterization technique to two examples from econometrics literature and 
demonstrating that their test has better power properties than tests previously proposed in the 
literature). 
  25. See THE SUPREME HISTORICAL SOCIETY, THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: 
ILLUSTRATED BIOGRAPHIES 1789–1995, at 461–65, 486–525 (Clare Cushman ed., 1995) 
[hereinafter SUPREME]. Upon his confirmation, Thomas joined Justices Harry Blackmun, 
Anthony Kennedy, Sandra Day O’Connor, William Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, David Souter, 
John Paul Stevens, and Byron White on the bench. Id. at 462, 487, 496–97, 512. Former Justice 
Byron White, a Rhodes Scholar, graduated from Yale Law School magna cum laude. Id. at 
462. Justice Antonin Scalia graduated magna cum laude from Harvard Law School and was a 
note editor on the Harvard Law Review. Id. at 512. Chief Justice William Rehnquist graduated 
first in his class at Stanford Law School, and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor graduated third in 
that very same class. Id. at 497. Finally, Justice John Paul Stevens graduated first in his class at 
Northwestern University School of Law with the highest grades of any student in the law 
school’s history. Id. at 502. It is important to note, however, that Yale had stopped giving letter 
grades by the time Thomas attended the school. 
Justice Thomas would later be joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen 
Breyer. Id. at 531–40. Justice Ginsburg, who graduated first in her class from Columbia Law 
School and was an editor of the Columbia Law Review, led a distinguished career as a professor 
at Rutgers Law School and later at Columbia Law School. Justice Ginsburg was a key player in 
early sex discrimination litigation cases and won five of six Supreme Court cases involving sex 
stereotyping before leading an equally distinguished career on the United States Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. See id. at 532–35. Justice Breyer, a Marshall Scholar who 
graduated magna cum laude from Harvard Law School and clerked for Supreme Court Justice 
Arthur Goldberg, also led a distinguished career as a law professor at Harvard Law School, 
worked as an assistant special prosecutor in the Watergate investigation, and developed a 
reputation “as one of the leading jurists of his generation” during his fifteen years on the United 
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. See id. at 537–40. 
  26. See id. at 462, 487, 497, 502. The late Justice White clerked for Supreme Court 
Justice Fred Vinson, Rehnquist clerked for Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, Stevens 
clerked for Supreme Court Justice Wiley Rutledge, and Justice Harry Blackmun clerked for his 
predecessor on the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, John B. Sanborn. See 
id. 
  27. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (detailing how Thomas himself 
indicated that race was the primary factor in his obtaining these positions). 
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colleagues.28 Finally, Thomas’s experience as a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the D.C. Circuit was minimal; he served for less than two years on that court with 
no evident impact.29 Thus, even Thomas’s most loyal supporters would have to 
concede that, on some level, Thomas joined the Supreme Court under the “shadow” of 
some racial preference.30 
Regardless of whether one believes Justice Thomas or his critics about 
whether he benefited from affirmative action, one question is never answered: why 
does it matter? Even if Thomas were a beneficiary of affirmative action, that fact 
would not forever bind him to support the policy.31 Therefore, why should anyone 
care if Thomas benefited from affirmative action, other than to sneer at his opposition 
to the use of racial preferences while those preferences were a factor in his 
advancement to the Court?32  
This Article provides one simple reason why one should care about whether 
Justice Thomas was a beneficiary of affirmative action: that perhaps, the Justice 
himself can be an argument for the legitimacy of affirmative action. To borrow 
slightly from a phrase of former Republican Assistant Attorney General Bradford 
Reynolds, Justice Thomas is, in certain ways, an example of affirmative action 
                                                                                                                                      
  28. See SUPREME, supra note 25, at 487, 502, 512, 522–23; Mark Tushnet, A Tribute 
to Justice Thurgood Marshall: Lawyer Thurgood Marshall, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1277, 1277 
(1992) (citing Andrew Rosenthal, Marshall Retires from High Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 
1991, at A1) (asserting that Marshall graduated first in his class at Howard University School 
of Law and was a great trial lawyer and appellate advocate who “won 29 of 32 cases he argued 
before the Supreme Court”). 
  29. In contrast, it is reported that Blackmun wrote several notable opinions during 
his eleven years on the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals; Stevens “gained distinction as a legal 
craftsman” during his five years on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals; Souter served 
successfully as a judge on the trial, appellate, and supreme courts of New Hampshire; and 
Scalia was highly admired for his legal intellect while on the D.C. Circuit. See SUPREME, supra 
note 24, at 464, 487, 503–04, 523–24.  
  30. Throughout his adult life, Thomas made efforts to escape from this shadow. For 
example, while at Yale Law School, Thomas avoided classes in civil rights and focused on tax 
and antitrust courses to rebut what he perceived as his white classmates’ belief that black law 
students were at Yale simply to fulfill a quota. See GREENYA, supra note 6, at 68, 94. As noted 
earlier, after law school, Thomas deliberately did not seek legal work as a civil rights lawyer to 
avoid any perception that his race played a role in his lawyering. See Gerber, supra note 11, at 
44. 
  31. See Volokh, supra note 5 (asserting that Justice Thomas has a duty to vote 
against any policy he thinks is unconstitutional regardless of “gratitude”).  
  32. See Sheryl McCarthy, Editorial, How Dare Justice Thomas Dissent on This One, 
NEWSDAY (N.Y.), June 26, 2003, at A40 (asserting that “[i]f Clarence Thomas really believes 
what he said about the University of Michigan case, we should expect his resignation by the 
end of the week”); Maureen Dowd, Editorial, Could Thomas Be Right?, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 
2003, at 25 (“[Justice Thomas’s dissent in Grutter] is a clinical study of a man who has been 
driven barking mad by the beneficial treatment he has received. It’s poignant really. It makes 
him crazy that people think he is where he is because of his race, but he is where he is because 
of his race. . . . It’s impossible not to be disgusted at someone who could benefit so much from 
affirmative action and then pull up the ladder after himself.”). 
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“working the right way.”33 After all, although Justice Thomas’s credentials were not 
as distinguished as those of his peers on the Court in a conventional sense,34 he cannot 
be completely faulted for this “lack” of qualifications. Like many beneficiaries of 
affirmative action,35 Thomas faced numerous obstacles that may have prevented him 
from obtaining certain credentials.36 For example, when Thomas graduated from Yale 
Law School in 1974, there were very few black federal judges37 who could hire law 
                                                                                                                                      
  33. Merida & Fletcher, supra note 1. In other ways, Thomas is not a good example 
of “affirmative action working.” See discussion infra Conclusion. 
  34. Given consistent and harsh criticism regarding Thomas’s lack of qualifications 
for the bench during and after his appointment, I expected to find a huge disparity between 
Thomas’s credentials and those of his peers, but, on the contrary, I found that the disparity was 
not as wide as I originally imagined, if not minimal. For example, prior to their appointments to 
the United States Supreme Court, neither White nor Rehnquist had any judicial experience. See 
SUPREME, supra note 25, at 462–65, 487. 
  35. Beneficiaries of race-based affirmative action (which is intrinsically linked to 
class) often face numerous obstacles, including daily societal discrimination; impoverished 
schools, lacking not only in luxuries such as Advanced Placement or Honors courses but also in 
necessities, such as books; standardized test scores that predict race and class more than 
performance; and lowered expectations based on racial stereotypes from teachers. See Dawn R. 
Swink, Back to Bakke: Affirmative Action Revisited in Educational Diversity, 2003 B.Y.U. 
EDUC. & L.J. 211, 253–54 (2003) (describing the disadvantages that many black, Latino, and 
Native American students must overcome). Some have argued that affirmative action primarily 
benefits middle-class minorities who do not face many of these obstacles. See Walter Benn 
Michaels, Diversity’s False Solace, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2004, at 13 (contending that “[w]hen 
students and faculty activists struggle for cultural diversity, they are in large part battling over 
what skin color the rich kids should have”); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 355 n.3 
(2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the law school’s 
admissions process “does nothing for those too poor or uneducated to participate in elite higher 
education”). Even if one accepts this assertion, there are numerous studies that demonstrate 
that, when wealth is defined in terms broader than just income alone, including assets, prestige 
of job and education level required for job, savings, retirement, and so on, Blacks and Latinos 
are far from being in the same position as Whites. See generally MELVIN OLIVER & THOMAS 
SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL EQUALITY 100–10 
(1995) (asserting that when factors other than income are included, black families are 
significantly worse off than white families with similar incomes); R. Richard Banks, 
Meritocratic Values and Racial Outcomes: Defending Class-Based College Admissions, 79 
N.C. L. REV. 1029, 1068 (2001) (pointing out that “middle class blacks hold dramatically less 
wealth than whites with comparable education and income” and that “[l]ow socioeconomic 
status whites, as measured by education and income, have a wealth-holding comparable to 
many middle class blacks”); see also Deborah C. Malamud, Affirmative Action: Diversity of 
Opinions: Affimative Action, Diversity, and the Black Middle Class, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 939, 
967–88 (1997) (same); Cheryl I. Harris, Mining in Hard Ground, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2487, 
2537–38 (2003) (book review) (same). 
  36. See Merida & Fletcher, supra note 1 (detailing some of the obstacles that a poor 
Thomas faced). 
  37. In May of 1974, there were sixteen black judges out of 506 judges on the federal 
bench: twelve district court judges, three circuit court judges, and one Supreme Court Justice. 
See PETER BARNETT, LAW CLERKS IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS AND STATE APPELLATE 
COURTS: AN AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY RESEARCH STUDY 7 (1973) (indicating the number 
of federal judges in 1973); see also Elaine Jones & Edward B. Toles, Presidential 
Appointments of African-American Article III Judges (Jan. 30, 2003), at www.jtbf.org/ 
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clerks,38 and even fewer white judges who were hiring black law clerks at the time,39 a 
problem that still remains to this day.40 Additionally, as Thomas himself has noted, 
                                                                                                                                      
pres_appt.htm. Even in present times, Blacks make up a small percentage of all federal judges. 
See James J. Brudney, Recalibrating Federal Judicial Independence, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 149, 169 
n.68 (2003) (asserting that the number of black federal district judges was thirty-four in 1992 
and seventy-one in 2001 and the number of black federal appellate judges was nine in 1992 and 
twelve in 2001). 
  38. Many black judges have taken a special interest in hiring minority law clerks. 
See Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Judging the Judges: Racial Diversity, Impartiality, and Representation 
on State Trial Courts, 39 B.C. L. REV. 95, 139 & n.241 (1997) (“Similarly, the presence of 
African American judges often corresponds to a marked increase in the hiring of African 
American court personnel.”); see, e.g., Arthur L. Burnett, Sr., Promoting Diversity as the 
Ultimate Means of Achieving True Equality for All Persons in the Nation, 50 FED. LAW. 47, 49 
n.19 (2003) (“An outstanding example of such a mentor is Senior Judge Damon Keith of the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, who, over his 35 years on the bench, has had 61 
minority judicial law clerks—African-American, Asian, Hispanic, American Indian, and Arab 
American—out of 72 judicial law clerks.”); James O. Freedman, Thurgood Marshall: Man of 
Character, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1487, 1497 (1994) (noting that Justice “Marshall chose more 
black and minority law clerks than any other Justice, and many of these men and women now 
serve on the faculties of the nation’s leading law schools,” including Professor Randall 
Kennedy of Harvard Law School and Professor Stephen Carter of Yale Law School); J. Clay 
Smith, Jr., United States Foreign Policy and Goler Teal Butcher, 37 HOW. L.J. 139, 148 & 
n.42, 148 (1994) (recording that “Hastie’s first law clerk, John R. Wilkens, was black,” that 
Goler Teal Butcher was “the first black woman to clerk at the federal circuit level,” and that 
“Hastie’s selection of Professor Butcher is an example of how a racially diverse judiciary 
expanded the opportunities of talented black men and women to federal and state judicial 
clerkships”).  
  39. See Mark Tushnet, Thurgood Marshall and the Brethren, 80 GEO. L.J. 2109, 
2126–27 (1992) (pointing out that “[p]rior to Marshall’s appointment, only one African-
American had served as a law clerk to any of the Justices”). 
  40. Several years ago, the United States Supreme Court Justices were heavily 
criticized for the low number of minority clerks. See Angela Onwuachi-Willig, When Different 
Means the Same: Applying a Different Standard of Proof to White Plaintiffs Under the 
McDonnell Douglas Prima Facie Case Test, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 53, 69 n.77 (1999) 
(describing the NAACP’s protest against the Justices’ hiring practices); see also Tony Mauro, 
U.S. Court Justices Grilled Over Lack of Diversity Among Clerks, N.J. L.J., Mar. 20, 2000, at 
11 (reporting on a congressional hearing concerning the paucity of minority law clerks selected 
by Supreme Court Justices); cf. Randall Kennedy, The Clerkship Question and the Court, AM. 
LAW., Apr. 1999, at 114 (noting that the paucity of minorities in the highest circles of the legal 
profession is a problem but asserting that it stems from many sources, “including the social 
inequities that effectively bar all too many blacks from any higher education . . . and customs 
and reflexes that make it more difficult for black students to gain access to the valuable social 
networks that advance careers in the law”). The lack of minority law clerks is especially 
significant, given the important role that clerks make in assisting judges in their decisions. See 
generally JOHN BILYEU OAKLEY & ROBERT S. THOMPSON, LAW CLERKS AND THE JUDICIAL 
PROCESS: PERCEPTIONS OF THE QUALITIES AND FUNCTIONS OF LAW CLERKS IN AMERICAN 
COURTS (1980) (investigating how clerks may influence judges in making decisions). 
Justice Thomas, who has had one black law clerk since his appointment and has one 
incoming black clerk, Larry Thompson, Jr., has suggested that “the dearth of black law clerks 
[i]s attributable less to race and more to class.” Merida & Fletcher, supra note 1.  
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after his graduation he encountered vicious racism as a black man seeking a law firm 
job in his home state of Georgia.41  
Yet based on Thomas’s rise from Pin Point, Georgia, to Yale Law School to 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, Thomas had at least demonstrated that 
he had the potential to become a good Supreme Court Justice with an independent 
judicial voice and to make unique contributions for the Court.42 The only question is, 
how has he met the task? 
This Article analyzes Justice Thomas’s appointment to the Supreme Court 
and contends that Justice Thomas’s seat and performance on the Court ironically make 
the case for forward-looking affirmative action. Part I examines and discusses several 
of the arguments that proponents of affirmative action assert in favor of the policy, in 
particular, enhanced learning and performance as a result of interracial diversity, the 
negation of stereotypes about group viewpoints as a result of exposure to intraracial 
diversity of perspective, and a rejection of traditional standards of merit. Part II of this 
Article then explicates the various ways in which Justice Thomas, a “tool”43 of sorts 
                                                                                                                                      
  41. See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 1 (manuscript at 41–42) (noting that Thomas 
had been rejected by every law firm in Atlanta and that Thomas still has those rejection letters 
in his possession). It bears noting that Justices O’Connor and Ginsburg experienced similar 
discrimination when they sought jobs upon their graduation. As Justice Ginsburg once 
remarked, after O’Connor graduated near the top of her class at Stanford Law School, “no 
private firm would hire her to do a lawyer’s work.” Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on 
Women’s Progress in the Legal Profession in the United States, 33 TULSA L.J. 13, 14 (1997) 
(quoting O’Connor as saying “‘I interviewed with law firms in Los Angeles and San Francisco 
. . . but none had ever hired a woman before as a lawyer, and they were not prepared to do 
so’”); Sandra Day O’Connor, Thurgood Marshall: The Influence of a Raconteur, 44 STAN. L. 
REV. 1217, 1219 (1992) (describing the gender discrimination she experienced “when law 
firms would only hire [her], a ‘lady lawyer,’ as a legal secretary”). Like O’Connor, despite her 
excellent credentials, Ginsburg also experienced difficulty finding a job. She “received no job 
offers from New York law firms” and was not “able to obtain a clerkship interview with a 
Supreme Court Justice.” SUPREME, supra note 25, at 532. Ultimately, District Court Judge 
Edmund L. Palmieri hired her as his law clerk. See id.  
In response to criticism about the lack of minority law clerks at the Supreme Court, Justice 
Thomas once replied, “‘I would love to see the day when I have . . . four minority clerks who 
can hold their heads up proudly and high around that Court and say, ‘I am here under the same 
criteria, doing the same job, and I’m just as good as anybody else here.’’ He added, ‘I think any 
member of the Court would be proud of that.’” Tony Mauro, Clerks: Minority Ranks Rise, 
LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 16, 2000, at 10.  
  42. See Scott D. Gerber, Justice Clarence Thomas: First Term, First Impressions, 
35 HOW L.J. 115, 120–21 (1992) (indicating “that initial bewilderment [on the Court] is less 
likely to occur for new Justices with prior judicial or political experience” and that Thomas’s 
“extensive service as chairman of the EEOC and his tenure . . . on the D.C. Circuit” were good 
preparation for the Court). 
  43. As noted earlier, my use of the term “tool” applies only to the way Republican 
administrations have used Clarence Thomas, because of his race, to advance their political 
goals, while simultaneously opposing affirmative action. Merida & Fletcher, supra note 1. In 
fact, as several scholars have explained, the Bush administration used Thomas’s race and class 
background to defend his nomination. See Yxta Maya Murray, The Cultural Implications of 
Judicial Selection, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 374, 379–81 (1994) (analyzing Thomas’s confirmation 
process and how it was infused with race consciousness). For example, as Professor Kendall 
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of the Bush administration (which vigorously opposed affirmative action),44 makes the 
case for forward-looking affirmative action, including through his own jurisprudence. 
Finally, this Article identifies the various ways in which Justice Thomas’s career may 
not serve as a good defense for affirmative action, in particular, the ways in which the 
Justice’s life does not advance several of the reasons underlying the support of race 
consciousness in admissions and hiring, including through judicial appointments. This 
Article then concludes with a discussion of the ways in which Justice Thomas, 
through his dissent in Grutter v. Bollinger,45 has laid the foundation for truly 
transforming selection criteria in schools and in the workplace. 
I. IN DEFENSE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION  
If affirmative action means what I described, what I’m for, then I’m for 
it. 
—George W. Bush46 
Forward-looking affirmative action programs in employment and admissions 
have evolved over a period of more than forty years. This Part of the Article focuses 
and reflects on selected arguments in favor of forward-looking affirmative action, 
such as the contribution of differing perspectives based on racial diversity and the 
manner in which intraracial diversity of perspective helps to defeat racial stereotyping 
about what is the “minority viewpoint.” Part I.A provides a brief history of the 
development of race-based affirmative action in the United States and addresses 
certain pro-affirmative action arguments as they relate to the benefits of diversity. Part 
I.B then describes such views as they relate to expanding traditional standards of 
merit. 
A. Brief History of Affirmative Action 
The term “affirmative action” as it relates to race discrimination was first 
used in 196147 when President John F. Kennedy issued Executive Order 10,925,48 
                                                                                                                                      
Thomas of Columbia University School of Law illustrated, Thomas’s qualifications for the 
court were often framed in terms of his rise from poverty and against discrimination. See 
Kendall Thomas, Strange Fruit, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA 
HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 380 (Toni Morrison ed., 
1992) (quoting Senator John Danforth as stating “‘Nobody here was born black in the 
segregated South. Nobody here was raised in a shack for 7 years without plumbing, in a broken 
home. Nobody knows that. Nobody has experienced that. Clarence Thomas has.’”). 
  44. See Neal Devins, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena and the Continuing 
Irrelevance of Supreme Court Affirmative Action Decisions, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 673, 679, 
690–91 (1996) (noting that, during the first Bush administration, forces favoring affirmative 
action dominated); Emmanuel O. Iheukwumere & Phillip C. Aka, Title VII, Affirmative Action, 
and the March Toward Color-Blind Jurisprudence, 11 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 1, 10 
(2001) (“Although Reagan’s successor, George Bush, promised ‘a kinder, gentler presidency,’ 
White House opposition to affirmative action continued unabated during his administration.”). 
  45. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
  46. George W. Bush, Presidential Debates in St. Louis, Missouri (Oct. 17, 2000), 
http://www.debates.org/pages/trans2000c.html. 
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which required that any contractor with a federal contract of $10,000 or more “take 
affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are 
treated during employment, without regard to their race, color, creed, or national 
origin.”49 Although the term “affirmative action” was first linked to racial 
discrimination in President Kennedy’s 1961 executive order, its creation was actually 
part of a long line of executive orders that were intended to expand employment 
opportunities for Blacks.50 Such efforts to improve job opportunities for Blacks began 
twenty years earlier with President Franklin Roosevelt’s issuance of Executive Order 
880251 in 1941, which was promulgated in response to the demands of black labor 
leaders.52  
Thus, when President Lyndon Johnson expanded the policy of affirmative 
action by issuing the famous Executive Order 11,246,53 the environment was ripe for 
the new order’s procedures.54 Eventually, by the mid-1960s and early 1970s, 
affirmative action had spread into the educational arena.55 Soon, with Executive Order 
11,246 and certain other regulations permitting the use of voluntary policies in the 
absence of prior discrimination,56 forward-looking affirmative action programs 
developed across the nation and eventually evolved into policies that consciously 
acknowledged race and gender in an effort to increase minority and female 
participation in contracting, employment, and education.57  
                                                                                                                                      
  47. The term had previously been used in the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 
which authorized the NLRB to provide “affirmative action” remedies, such as reinstatement of 
employees in the event of unfair labor practices by management. M. ALI RAZA ET AL., THE UPS 
AND DOWNS OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PREFERENCES 8 (1999); see also West, supra note 2, at 
612–13. 
  48. Exec. Order No. 10,925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (Mar. 6,1961). 
  49. Id. 
  50. See RAZA ET AL., supra note 47, at 7. 
  51. Exec. Order No. 8802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3109 (June 25,1941). 
  52. See The Executive Order Program, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1275, 1280 (1971). 
  53. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (Sep. 24, 1965). 
  54. See Robert M. Berdahl, Policies of Opportunity: Fairness and Affirmative 
Action in the Twenty-First Century, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 115, 117 (2000) (“Linked to the 
provision of equal opportunity, affirmative action was meant to counterbalance the many years 
in which equal opportunity had been denied to African-Americans by many forms of 
institutionalized racism.”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Making Sense of the Affirmative Action 
Debate, 22 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1159, 1161–63 (1996) (discussing the various goals of 
affirmative action). 
  55. See West, supra note 2, at 619; Swink, supra note 35, at 214–15. 
  56. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(6)(ii) (1973) (“Even in the absence of such prior 
discrimination, a recipient in administering a program may take affirmative action to overcome 
the effects of conditions which resulted in limiting participation by persons of a particular race, 
color, or national origin.”). 
  57. See Susan Low Bloch, Looking Ahead: The Future of Affirmative Action, 52 
AM. U. L. REV. 1507, 1507 n.3 (2003). For example, in 1970, the Department of Labor required 
employers with fifty of more employees to create timetables and establish goals for hiring 
minority workers. See id. But see Clarence Thomas, Affirmative Action Goals and Timetables: 
Too Tough? Not Tough Enough!, 5 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 402, 405–11 (1987) (arguing why 
goals and timetables will not end employment discrimination). 
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Moreover, these programs were recognized and upheld by the Supreme Court 
in cases such as United Steelworkers of America v. Weber.58 In Weber, a group of 
white plaintiffs challenged a voluntary affirmative action program that was a hybrid 
remedial and forward-looking program in that it was adopted to eliminate traditional 
patterns of racial segregation but not any particular discrimination by the employer 
itself.59 The program required that fifty percent of all openings in “in-plant” craft 
training programs be reserved for Blacks until the percentage of black craft-workers 
was commensurate with the percentage of Blacks in the local labor force.60 The 
plaintiffs alleged that the program discriminated against them in violation of Title VII 
because it placed an unfair burden on Whites.61 The Supreme Court, however, rejected 
their claims.62 In so doing, the Court asserted: 
It would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Nation’s concern over 
centuries of racial injustice and intended to improve the lot of those 
who had “been excluded from the American dream for so long,” . . . 
constituted the first legislative prohibition of all voluntary, private, 
race-conscious efforts to abolish traditional patterns of racial 
segregation and hierarchy.63  
Just one year earlier in Regents of University of California v. Bakke,64 the 
Supreme Court, through Justice Powell’s decision, explicitly recognized one of the 
benefits of forward-looking affirmative action in education when it described the gains 
that could be garnered from a diverse body of students who could bring varying 
perspectives based upon their backgrounds.65 In that case, Alan Bakke, a white male 
in his thirties, filed a lawsuit against the University of California at Davis Medical 
School, alleging that the school’s admissions policy was unconstitutional under the 
Equal Protection Clause because it reserved certain seats in its entering class for 
minority students,66 thereby causing his rejection by the medical school.67 In the end, 
the Court, with a fifth vote from Justice Powell, upheld the lower court’s decision to 
                                                                                                                                      
  58. 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
  59. See id. at 201. 
  60. See id. at 199, 208. 
  61. See id. at 197–201. 
  62. See id.  
  63. See id. at 204. In Johnson v. Transp. Agency of Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 
616 (1987), the Supreme Court later upheld a voluntary affirmative action program, which 
included women. 
  64. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
  65. Id. at 321–22 (including in Justice Powell’s Appendix the Harvard College 
Admissions Program description, which stated that “[t]he belief that diversity adds an essential 
ingredient to the educational process has long been a tenet of Harvard College admissions”); 
see also Karst, supra note 2, at 60 (asserting that the Powell opinion “justified the consideration 
of race as one factor in a public university’s admissions process designed to produce diversity 
in its student body for educational purposes”). 
  66. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 276–78. 
  67. Bakke had applied to twelve medical schools, including the University of 
California-Davis. See Michael Selmi, The Life of Bakke: An Affirmative Action Retrospective, 
87 GEO. L.J. 981, 985–86 (1999). Bakke was rejected by all twelve schools. The next year 
Bakke focused his energies on Davis alone. Id.  
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admit Bakke into medical school.68 At the same time however, the Court, also with 
Powell’s vote, overturned the lower court’s prohibition on race consciousness.69 
Asserting that it was not necessary to set aside a certain number of seats to obtain a 
racially diverse student body,70 Justice Powell proclaimed that schools could use race 
to obtain a more diverse entering class.71 In so doing, he quoted from a catalogue of 
Harvard College, noting that, “‘[a] farm boy from Idaho can bring something to 
Harvard College that a Bostonian cannot offer. Similarly, a black student can usually 
bring something that a white person cannot offer.’”72 
As time progressed and challenges to non-remedial affirmative action 
programs flourished,73 proponents of affirmative action articulated numerous other 
benefits of non-remedial policies, expounding upon the principles of diversity and 
cross-racial understanding that Justice Powell expressed in Bakke.74 These precepts 
are practically limitless and include factors such as the preparation of persons for 
                                                                                                                                      
  68. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320; see also Susan Welch & John Gruhl, Does Bakke 
Matter? Affirmative Action and Minority Enrollments in Medical and Law Schools, 59 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 697, 702 (1998) (asserting that “Powell provided the fifth vote for one issue from each 
bloc [of Justices on the Court], and his opinion became the controlling opinion”). 
  69. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319–20; see also Kim Forde-Mazrui, Will Affirmative Action 
Survive?, LEGAL TIMES, June 17, 2002, at 24 (stating that Justice Powell concluded that “some 
attention to race was constitutional to achieve a diverse student body”). 
  70. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316. 
  71. Id. at 314–15; see also Adrien Katherine Wing, Race-Based Affirmative Action 
in American Legal Education, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 443, 444 (2001) (asserting that Powell’s 
opinion held “that race could be a plus factor in admissions”). 
  72. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316 (emphasis added); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 
306, 324 (2003). 
  73. Within the past ten years, numerous interest groups have mounted an attack 
against voluntary affirmative action programs in the courts. See Swink, supra note 35, at 211 
(declaring that “affirmative action is under the most serious attack it has endured in decades”); 
Carla D. Pratt, In the Wake of Hopwood: An Update on Affirmative Action in the Education 
Arena, 42 HOW. L.J. 451, 451 (1999) (noting that opponents of affirmative action have been 
waging war on the policy in the courts). The attack has also occurred outside of the courtroom, 
and the bases of these attacks range from claims of reverse discrimination to the imposition of 
damaging stigma on minority students to claims regarding the unfair admission of unqualified 
students. In 1996, Ward Connerly, then a Regent of the University of California, rallied 
Californians to vote for Proposition 209, which prohibited the use of racial preferences in 
public employment, education, and contracting. Connerly and his followers have also targeted 
other states, such as Michigan. See Susan E. Eckes, Race Conscious Admissions Programs: 
Where Do Universities Go from Gratz and Grutter?, 33 J.L. & EDUC. 21, 55 (2004) (“In 
response to the U.S. Supreme Court Grutter case, Ward Connerly and other conservative 
activists plan to sponsor ballot initiatives, similar to that of California’s Proposition 209, which 
bans racial preferences. In addition to Michigan, Connerly hopes to have three or four such 
ballot measures on state ballots by November 2004. As it stands, the Grutter decision has no 
direct effect on California’s public colleges or universities because of Proposition 209. The 
state of Washington has passed a similar measure.”); Pratt, supra, note 73 at 460 (describing 
the success of anti-affirmative action initiatives in California and Washington); see also Wing, 
supra note 71, at 446–47 (same). 
  74. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316–26. 
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work and leadership in an increasingly diverse society,75 enhanced performance and 
learning through the inclusion of all people,76 confidence in the integrity of 
educational institutions and workplaces,77 the negation of racial labels about 
“minority” jobs or roles,78 the defeat of racial stereotyping about the existence of a 
monolithic minority viewpoint through an exposure to intraracial diversity of 
opinion,79 an expansion of traditional standards of merit,80 compensation for wrongful 
                                                                                                                                      
  75. See Karst, supra note 2, at 60, 66–68 (reporting that the Supreme Court reasoned 
that the “inclusion of substantial numbers of minority students in the universities is a matter of 
compelling importance . . . because the universities are gateways to leadership in American 
institutions” and stating that “valuing diversity has helped the bottom line”); see also Grutter, 
539 U.S. at 330 (citing Brief of Amici Curiae for American Educational Research Association 
et al. at 3, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241)) (noting that “numerous studies show that 
student body diversity promotes learning outcomes, and ‘better prepares students for an 
increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better prepares them as professionals’”).  
  76. See Karst, supra note 2, at 67 (describing the use of affirmative action in the 
armed services and noting that “the inclusion of minority officers in all levels of the officer 
corps” improved the services’ performance). See generally Patricia McKeown, Diversity in the 
Workplace: What Does It Mean for Your Bottom Line?, WISC. LAW., Apr. 1994, at 10–11 (“The 
diversity experts, major law firms across the country and corporate law departments all say the 
same thing: it’s time to wake up and smell the bottom line. Diversity isn’t just a nice idea. It’s 
becoming an issue of competitiveness, with the most diverse firms getting the edge in an 
increasingly diverse marketplace.”); Steven A. Ramirez, Diversity and the Boardroom, 6 STAN. 
L.J. BUS. & FIN. 85, 90–131(2000) (arguing that diversity can be managed to enhance 
productivity and that the business community has taken the lead in this effort); see also 
Chander, supra note 2, at 165–77 (arguing that the reasons why the law protects minority 
shareholders are also the reasons why the law should sometimes promote affirmative action for 
minority races). But see Thomas W. Joo, Race, Corporate Law, and Shareholder Value, 54 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 351, 363 (2004) (deconstructing the shareholder wealth argument as it applies to 
diversity and affirmative action and explicating the dangers in “founding a racial agenda on 
nonracial values”); David B. Wilkins, From “Separate Is Inherently Unequal” to “Diversity Is 
Good for Business”: The Rise of Market-Based Diversity Arguments and the Fate of the Black 
Corporate Bar, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1548, 1559 (2004) (arguing that “there are also good 
reasons to believe that black lawyers who maintain a normative understanding of diversity that 
goes beyond corporate self-interest may also have important advantages in building a credible 
‘business case’ for diversity in their own careers”). 
  77. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332 (“In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy 
in the eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to talented 
and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity. All members of our heterogeneous society 
must have confidence in the openness and integrity of the educational institutions that provide 
this training.”). 
  78. See Edward M. Chen, The Judiciary, Diversity, and Justice for All, 10 ASIAN 
L.J. 127, 134 (2003) (asserting that “[a] further harm of segregation and underrepresentation is 
the perpetuation of detrimental stereotypes, continuing the myth that certain groups are 
inherently incapable of attaining certain accomplishments or performing certain jobs”). See 
also Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, What Exactly Is Racial Diversity?, 91 CAL. L. REV. 
1149, 1155 (2003) (same). Cf. Brief of Amicus Curiae of American Federation of Labor & 
Congress of Industrial Organizations in Support of Respondents, Grutter (No. 02-241), Gratz 
(No. 02-516) (providing social science evidence to show that students who attend diverse 
schools are less likely than others to think in terms of racial stereotypes). 
  79. See Cynthia Estlund, Taking Grutter to Work, 7 GREEN BAG 215, 220 (2004) 
(translating the arguments in Grutter to the corporate context and asserting that “cooperation 
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injuries caused by societal discrimination,81 a greater likelihood that historically 
disadvantaged groups will receive needed services and donations because individuals 
tend to be most charitable to members of their own racial and ethnic groups,82 an 
increased number of role models for all young people, especially minorities,83 and an 
acknowledgement and understanding that merit can be defined in various ways.84  
B. The Benefits of Diversity 
Although, as noted above, numerous arguments have been articulated in 
favor of affirmative action, the hallmark of most forward-looking affirmative action 
policies is diversity. The importance of achieving diversity through affirmative action 
has been repeatedly detailed in numerous articles and books85 and, most recently, in 
                                                                                                                                      
among diverse co-workers builds interpersonal bonds, combats stereotypes, and promotes 
understanding and empathy across racial lines”); Karst, supra note 2, at 71 (“Sustained daily 
association with another person in carrying out a joint task takes you beyond the point where 
you look at that person and see nothing but a racial or ethnic label; as you become well-
acquainted with the whole person, the label fades. And when this sort of interaction is 
multiplied across more and more individuals’ experience, the labels will lose their importance 
on a larger scale.”). 
  80. See Kenneth L. Karst & Harold W. Horowitz, Affirmative Action and Equal 
Protection, 60 VA. L. REV. 955, 963–70 & passim (1974) (arguing that the idea of merit is not 
self-defining and is not limited to only certain types of past performance). 
  81. See Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action for Whom?, 47 STAN. L. 
REV. 855, 865 (1995) (analyzing corrective justice as a rationale for affirmative action). 
  82. See Paul Brest, Some Comments on Grutter v. Bollinger, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 683, 
683–86 (2003) (stating that individuals tend to give to organizations that support “groups with 
which they identify on the basis of characteristics such as race, ethnicity, and religion”); see 
also Brest & Oshige, supra note 81, at 867–72 (same). 
  83. See Chen, supra note 78, at 134 (“[D]iversity provides role models for those 
historically excluded. It can provide a source of hope and inspiration for those who would 
otherwise limit their horizons and aspirations.”). See also Chemerinsky, supra note 54, at 
1165–66 (same); Angela I. Onwuachi-Willig, Bird Creates Buzz About Race in the NBA: The 
Importance of Role Models is Evident Even in Pro Basketball Careers, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jul. 
6, 2004, at B7 (discussing the need for role models in sports and schools). The Supreme Court 
has rejected the “role model” argument as a basis for using race in layoffs. See Wygant v. 
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986). In dissent, Justice Stevens argued in favor of 
the constitutionality of a program that worked to provide an integrated faculty, asserting that 
there is “a critical difference between a decision to exclude a member of a minority race 
because of his or her skin color and a decision to include more members of the minority in a 
school faculty for that reason.” Id. at 316 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
  84. See Lani Guinier, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at the Gates 
of Our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113, 214–24 (2003) (urging a re-evaluation of 
admissions choices). 
  85. See, e.g., WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG 
TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS (1998); 
Brest, supra note 82, at 683–85 (discussing why diversity is important to legal education); 
Kevin R. Johnson & Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Rollin’ on the River: The Limits of “A Systemic 
Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools”, 11 AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y REP. 
(forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 5–9, on file with Author). 
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the Supreme Court’s decision, Grutter v. Bollinger.86 As previously mentioned, the 
pronounced benefits of diversity are manifold, including enhanced knowledge and 
learning among participants of differing backgrounds because of exposure to diverse 
perspectives,87 an increased ability to work and live with persons of different 
backgrounds,88 the destruction of racial stereotypes about intellectual capacity and 
viewpoints,89 and recognition that merit can be defined in many ways.90 
In defending affirmative action, proponents contend that interracial diversity 
is critical in promoting understanding across racial lines because it helps to ensure 
meaningful representation of people who belong to marginalized racial groups and 
who may bring perspectives that persons outside of their group may not hold.91 Such 
diversity, these supporters contend, enables individuals to empathize with people who 
are different than they are and to relate to them in a way that one can only relate to 
another person in the flesh.92 After all, when people interact regularly across racial 
lines, they learn to appreciate their similarities and differences,93 and they learn to 
                                                                                                                                      
  86. 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003) (“[T]oday we endorse Justice Powell’s view that 
student body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university 
admissions.”). 
  87. See Expert Report of Patricia Gurin: Summary and Conclusions, Grutter (No. 
97-75928), available at http:/www.umich.edu/~urel/admissions/legal/expert/summ.html 
(asserting that “[s]tudents who experienced the most racial and ethnic diversity in classroom 
settings and in informal interactions with peers showed the greatest engagement in active 
thinking processes, growth in intellectual engagement and motivation, and growth in 
intellectual and academic skills”). 
  88. See Karst, supra note 2, at 60 (noting that an educational advantage of student 
diversity is “the preparation of graduates for a society and a work force that are growing more 
and more diverse”). 
  89. See Swink, supra note 35, at 211 (stating that learning with “people from 
different walks of life and diverse backgrounds . . . helps [to] destroy racial stereotypes and 
animosity”). 
  90. See Guinier, supra note 84, at 134 n.87 (noting that there are many ways to 
define merit and that “[m]erit is contextual and a function of institutional mission”). 
  91. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 78, at 1158–61 (detailing how a person’s 
viewpoint is influenced by racial identity and how diversity may shape the content of 
discussions); see also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 319 (same). 
  92. See Chemerinsky, supra note 54, at 1163 (stating that discussions about race and 
affirmative action in his constitutional law class were vastly different when a significant 
number of minorities were present and that his “students learned more and benefited more from 
the discussion when minority students were present”); see also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 n.48 
(quoting President William Bowen of Princeton University) (“[A] great deal of learning occurs 
informally. It occurs through interactions among students of both sexes; of different races, 
religions, and backgrounds; who come from cities and rural areas, from various states and 
countries; who have a wide variety of interests, talents, and perspectives; and who are able, 
directly or indirectly, to learn from their differences and to stimulate one another to reexamine 
even their most deeply held assumptions about themselves and their world. As a wise graduate 
of ours observed in commenting on this aspect of the educational process, ‘People do not learn 
very much when they are surrounded only by the likes of themselves.’”). 
  93. See Brest, supra note 82, at 685 (arguing that “[a] class drawn from various 
backgrounds allows students to appreciate commonalties as well as differences among their 
classmates, and to learn to communicate across racial boundaries”). 
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communicate and work across socially constructed racial boundaries.94 Moreover, 
prejudice against and the alienation of certain racial minorities can be reduced,95 and 
stereotypes about the abilities of certain groups or their belonging are more easily 
defeated when there is increased interaction among people of various races.96 For 
example, students who are exposed to competent minority teachers are less likely to 
hold onto negative stereotypes not only about the intellectual capacities of minority 
teachers but also about their minority peers.97 In fact, some studies have demonstrated 
that the recruitment of women and minorities under affirmative action programs has, 
in various instances, helped to reduce the beliefs of certain white men in the inferiority 
of other groups.98 
Additionally, racial and ethnic diversity serves as a constant reminder of the 
need to be inclusive in all aspects of life.99 As Dr. Patricia Gurin explained on behalf 
of the University of Michigan in Grutter, students who are educated in racially and 
ethnically diverse educational environments are also more likely to interact with a 
diverse group of friends, live in diverse neighborhoods, and work in diverse places of 
employment.100 In other words, not only do students in integrated schools gain new 
perspectives on particular issues from their peers and learn how to co-exist with 
different people as a result of diversity, but students and workers in diverse 
environments also better learn how to interact with clients and constituencies that are 
becoming increasingly more diverse within our global society.101 
                                                                                                                                      
  94. See Brest & Oshige, supra note 81, at 862 (exploring the rationales for 
affirmative action and how they apply to different racial groups). 
  95. Id. at 863. 
  96. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 78, at 1155–56 (describing how diversity 
disrupts negative social meanings about race). 
  97. See Harry T. Edwards, Race and the Judiciary, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 325, 
329 (2002) (“When non-minority students were not exposed to outstanding minority teachers, 
they too easily harbored distorted views of minority students as intellectually deficient. 
Likewise, some nonminority faculty had confused views of minority students, because they had 
had no occasion to work with minority peers of equal standing in the profession.”). Cf. Alice 
M. Noble-Allgire, In Pursuit of Justice Powell’s Vision: Diversity-Conscious Admissions Is 
Just the First Step, 14 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 255, 272 (2003) (asserting that a “lack of 
diversity on the faculty sends a powerful, unspoken message about who is entitled to . . . 
respect and authority within the law school and within the legal profession as a whole”). 
  98. See Brest & Oshige, supra note 81, at 870–71 (referring to a study of the 
California Parks and Recreation Department) (citation omitted). 
  99. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 78, at 1154 (“Racial diversity has the 
potential to facilitate inclusion.”); Chen, supra note 78, at 134 (noting how diversity helped the 
ACLU broaden its agenda to include “the rights of women, gays and lesbians, and language 
minorities”). 
100. See Gurin, supra note 87 (“Students educated in diverse settings are more 
motivated and better able to participate in an increasingly heterogeneous and complex 
democracy. . . . Students with the most diversity experiences during college had the most cross-
racial interactions five years after leaving college.”). 
101. See Estlund, supra note 79, at 220 (“Where diversity is a given among the 
multiple constituencies with which a firm’s employees interact—suppliers, contractors, 
customers, and employees scattered throughout the far-flung units of a global enterprise—the 
experience of working with diverse co-workers will prepare employees to deal more effectively 
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Finally, in addition to improving cross-racial understanding, proponents of 
affirmative action assert that meaningful diversity assists in breaking down racial 
stereotypes because it forces people to learn that there is no “‘minority viewpoint’ but 
rather a variety of viewpoints among” minorities.102 In so doing, it teaches majority 
and minority members alike that not all people of the same race think or act the same. 
Moreover, it helps to display the range of political thought among racial minorities 
and within each racialized group103 and helps to enrich understanding of issues by 
ensuring the representation of numerous voices.104 Indeed, this argument in favor of 
affirmative action supports a central tenet of Critical Race Theory that there is not just 
one voice, but many voices that should be valued in society.105 More importantly, as 
many race scholars have argued, this rationale recognizes the need for including many 
voices within legal discourse, including many voices of color.106 
C. Re-Parameterizing Traditional Standards of Merit 
As well as outlining the benefits that flow from diversity, proponents of 
affirmative action also point to the way in which the policy helps schools and 
businesses focus on what is relevant in predicting performance,107 or more 
importantly, in helping these places fulfill their educational and workplace 
missions.108 In essence, the use of affirmative action and the performance of its 
                                                                                                                                      
with those constituencies.”); cf. Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal 
Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 585–602 (1990) (detailing the dangers and disadvantages in not 
including the voices of women of color in feminist legal theory). 
102. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 320 (2003) (quoting Dean Kent Syverud of 
Vanderbilt University Law School). 
103. Id. 
104. See Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L. REV. 495, 566 (2001) 
(arguing that it is important for law to address the exclusion of individuals who seek both to 
retain cultural membership and to pursue freedom from discrimination and repression within 
their cultural communities). 
105. See John A. Powell, A Minority-Majority Nation: Racing the Population in the 
Twenty-First Century, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1395, 1413–14 (2002) (noting that a “need exists 
to theorize about the relationship between groups of color and methods of giving their lived 
experience voice” but maintaining that the black-white paradigm can be useful in exploring the 
subordination of all people); see also Kevin R. Johnson & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, A Principled 
Approach to the Quest for Racial Diversity on the Judiciary, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 5 (2004) 
(forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 8–12, on file with Author). 
106. Cf. Juan F. Perea, The Black White Binary Paradigm of Race: The “Normal 
Science” of American Racial Thought, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1213, 1219–53 (1997) (asserting that it 
is critical for discussions on race to extend beyond the black/white binary). 
107. See CHARLES R. LAWRENCE III & MARI J. MATSUDA, WE WON’T GO BACK: 
MAKING THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 101 (1997) (“[M]erit should include the talents of 
those without privilege. . . . A good affirmative action plan broadens the definition of 
qualification, expanding the pool of talent available for any given opportunity.”). Cf. Susan 
Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 
CAL. L. REV. 953, 969 (1996) (indicating that standardized tests do not identify qualities 
important for the education the test takers seek). 
108. See Guinier, supra note 84, at 160, 194–97 (arguing that structural mobility 
“focuses society’s educational resources on those who are most likely to fulfill the aims of 
democracy”). 
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beneficiaries help to demonstrate that individual merit itself is not self-defining109 and 
is not limited to any particular category of standards.110 As Justice Powell himself 
acknowledged about Harvard College’s program in Bakke, affirmative action can 
direct a place to consider a broad range of qualities in determining merit, including 
“exceptional personal talents, unique work or service experience, leadership potential, 
maturity, demonstrated compassion, a history of overcoming disadvantage, ability to 
communicate with the poor, or other qualifications deemed important.”111 In sum, 
affirmative action may ensure that the characteristics sought in prospective applicants 
for schools and jobs truly predict whether those individuals will make the kinds of 
contributions that the institutions want them to make by creating a space in which 
other important factors, such as an individual’s efforts in overcoming significant 
socioeconomic obstacles, can be considered in the selection process.112 
The expansion of merit standards in affirmative action programs uncovers the 
fiction of a truly meritorious system.113 As several scholars have argued, merit is not a 
race-neutral concept,114 but rather a set of standards in any particular context where 
decision-makers have deferred to “social preferences about what constitutes value and 
how that value is produced.”115 In many instances, traditional “merit standards were 
developed by dominant social groups, in ways that [were intended to] 
disproportionately benefit[] their descendants.”116 For example, Professor Daria 
Roithmayr has revealed through a study of the history of law school admissions 
exactly how powerful individuals in the dominant group developed subjective social 
                                                                                                                                      
109. See Jack Greenberg, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Confronting the 
Condition and Theory, 43 B.C. L. REV. 521, 582 (2002) (acknowledging that merit can have 
many meanings). 
110. See Karst, supra note 2, at 62 n.8 (arguing that merit should be defined as 
potential fulfillment of social needs). 
111. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317 (1978). 
112. See Lani Guinier, Confirmative Action, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 565, 572–75 
(2000) (stating that a Michigan study has confirmed that affirmative action is “a better method 
for identifying qualified lawyers than conventional techniques” and forces a school to consider 
what it “is attempting to do when it then educates or trains the applicant who becomes a 
student”). 
113. Id. at 565 (arguing that a generational study on the careers of University of 
Michigan Law School Graduates revealed “that conventional test-based admission policies both 
mask and support deep flaws in the way we allocate opportunity and privilege”). 
114. Guinier, supra note 84, at 121 (asserting that current normative conceptions of 
merit are arbitrary); Banks, supra note 35, at 1034 (noting that “[m]erit is necessarily defined 
with respect to particular contexts, goals, and values”). 
115. Daria Roithmayr, Deconstructing the Distinction Between Bias and Merit, 85 
CAL. L. REV. 1449, 1454, 1473 (1998) (highlighting the fact that “for merit to do the job of 
rewarding ability and creating social value (and thereby displace bias), it must depend on and 
defer to subjective, arbitrary, status-oriented, culturally-specific definitions of ‘social value’”). 
See also Guinier, supra note 84, at 134 (same); PATRICIA A. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE 
AND RIGHTS 98–99 (1991) (same). 
116. Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Tenth Chronicle: Merit and Affirmative Action, 83 
GEO. L.J. 1711, 1718, 1721 (asserting that “[m]erit is what the victors impose”). See also 
Roithmayr, supra note 115, at 1475-94 (examining the history of law school admissions to 
prove that merit standards are the result of subjective, race-conscious preferences for particular 
kinds of abilities). 
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standards of merit for the purpose of excluding immigrants and Blacks from the legal 
profession.117 Specifically, Professor Roithmayr demonstrated how a direct effort to 
exclude Blacks, Latinos, and Eastern and Southern Europeans spawned the creation of 
the American Bar Association, “selective institutions,” and aptitude tests and also 
shifted American legal education from one based on practical experience to one based 
on abstract legal reasoning.118 Indeed, as was detailed in Professor Roithmayr’s 
article, such efforts proved extremely successful in locking out minorities from the 
legal profession, even though small numbers of minorities had previously succeeded 
in those jobs.119 For example, although in 1900 the state of Mississippi had twenty-
four black lawyers and South Carolina had twenty-nine, after more than forty years of 
changes designed to exclude racial minorities from the law, those numbers had 
dropped to three and five, respectively, by 1940.120  
Finally, as many proponents of affirmative action have asserted, traditional 
merit standards should be reevaluated, not only because they are often based on biased 
social factors and values, but also because they do not correlate highly with an 
individual’s success in a particular field.121 For example, a recent study at an elite law 
school disclosed that the LSAT explained only fourteen percent of the difference in 
first-year grades.122 Likewise, scholars Richard Lempert, David Chambers, and Terry 
Adams discovered in their study of graduates of the University of Michigan Law 
School that traditional factors, such as LSAT scores, had almost no relation to 
measures of post-law school success for minority students who were admitted in part 
because of affirmative action.123 In fact, the authors found that after graduation such 
minority students paralleled their white peers in advancement to positions of 
responsibility and in satisfaction with their careers, and outperformed their white peers 
in terms of service to and giving back to the community, another frequently cited 
benefit of affirmative action.124 In sum, these studies support what this Article refers 
to as the need for a “re-parameterization” of merit standards by revealing the 
weaknesses in factors that have been traditionally used for admission and hire. Much 
like scientists might change the parameters used to model a complex system when it is 
discovered that the old model does not appropriately describe its behavior, we must 
                                                                                                                                      
117. See Roithmayr, supra note 115, at 1475–94. 
118. See id. 
119. See id. at 1483–84. 
120. See id. at 1484. 
121. See Sturm & Guinier, supra note 107, at 969. 
122. See id. at 971 (referring to a study completed at the University of Pennsylvania 
Law School); see also William C. Kidder, The Rise of Testocracy: An Essay on the LSAT, 
Conventional Wisdom, and the Dismantling of Diversity, 9 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 167, 187 
(2000) (asserting that the LSAT predicts sixteen percent of the difference). 
123. David L. Chambers et al., Michigan’s Minority Graduates in Practice: The 
River Runs Through Law School, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 395, 401–02, 459–63, 492–503 
(2000); see also Richard Delgado, Official Elitism or Institutional Self Interest: 10 Reasons 
Why UC-Davis Should Abandon the LSAT (And Why Other Good Law Schools Should Follow 
Suit), 34 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 593, 598 (2001) (asserting that the LSAT does not test all 
relevant skills and also measures some that are irrelevant). 
124. Chambers et al. supra note 123, at 443–47, 453–59, 468–503; see also Richard 
Lempert et al., Myths About . . . Affirmative Action, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Oct. 2001, at 27–29 
(contradicting five myths of affirmative action with the results of their empirical investigation). 
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begin to re-parameterize the selection standards that we use for schools and jobs as we 
learn more about the failures of such standards.125 
II. ISN’T IT IRONIC? 
And life has a funny, funny way of helping you out . . . helping you 
out. 
—Alanis Morrisette126 
Many of the previously described arguments attach with equal force to 
judicial selections,127 including when viewed in relation to Justice Thomas’s life. This 
Part of the Article first considers how certain pro-affirmative action concepts apply to 
courts and the judicial selection process and then demonstrates how Justice Thomas’s 
career, and even selected portions of his own dissent in Grutter, support the 
continuation of forward-looking affirmative action. 
A. But All the Judges Are “Raced”128 
As noted above, many of the arguments regarding racial diversity in schools 
and workplaces can be transferred to a discussion of racial diversity on the bench.129 
For example, in the same way that interracial diversity in schools and in the workplace 
can promote cross-racial understanding and improve learning and performance due to 
differing perspectives, “[d]iversity on the bench can enrich judicial decision-making 
by including a variety of voices and perspectives in the deliberative process.”130 As 
Chief Judge Harry Edwards of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit once 
explained, “it is inevitable that judges’ different professional and life experiences have 
                                                                                                                                      
125. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing the term “re-
parameterize”). 
126. Alanis Morrisette, Ironic, on JAGGED LITTLE PILL (Maverick/Warner 1995). 
127. See Ifill, supra note 15, at 405–37. 
128. The term “raced” means that the views and approaches of all judges are 
influenced in part by their race or races, just as they are by other factors, including but not 
limited to class, gender, and sexuality. Specifically, the term “raced” rejects the idea that 
Whites, unlike Blacks and other minorities, are neutral, objective, and uninfluenced by race. 
See Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind, but Now I See”: White Race Consciousness and the 
Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 969–80 (1993). 
129. See generally Johnson & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 105 (manuscript at 21–
30); Ifill, supra note 15, at 405–37; Ifill, supra note 38, at 124–27 (asserting that racial 
minorities could seek to compel states to adopt affirmative action judicial selection plans). 
130. Ifill, supra note 15, at 405; see also Ifill, supra note 38, at 99; see also LINN 
WASHINGTON, BLACK JUDGES ON JUSTICE: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE BENCH 83–84 (1994) 
(“Black judges also bring a perspective that is sorely lacking in their absence. They bring some 
perspective, some insight from a segment of the community that has simply gone 
unrepresented. This perspective is born out of an experience that one has had growing up in a 
Black community as opposed to a white community.”). Judge Jerome Frank also once declared 
that men are not stripped of all their prejudices, biases, and influences simply because they are 
wearing a black robe and have taken the “oath of office as a judge.” In re J.P. Linahan, Inc., 
138 F.2d 650, 652–53 (2d Cir. 1943). 
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some bearing on how they confront various problems that come before them.”131 
Thus, judges of all races will bring their understanding of people, human experience, 
and even their own experiences with race and the law to the bench with them.132 
Furthermore, Professors Sherrilyn Ifill, Kevin Johnson, and Luis Fuentes-Rohwer 
have argued that because the idea of pure judicial neutrality is a myth,133 it is 
imperative that courts, including the Supreme Court, are comprised of individuals who 
represent a cross-section of the country—with differing views that are undeniably 
influenced by life experience.134 According to Judge Damon Keith of the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, even Justice Thomas himself has acknowledged the importance of 
increasing the number of minority judges, once proclaiming, “we have to get more 
Blacks on the federal bench.’”135 In fact, in 1998, Justice Thomas proved his 
commitment to diversity on the bench when he, at the request of his friend Judge 
                                                                                                                                      
131. Edwards, supra note 97, at 325, 329 (also explaining that an assertion that racial 
diversity betters our system for justice is not the same as saying race routinely influences the 
decisionmaking of judges). 
132.  See Chen, supra note 78, at 136–38 (describing how one judge’s experience as 
a child watching his grandfather be humiliated because of limited English-speaking skills 
informed that judge’s understanding of language discrimination). Cf. Kimberle Williams 
Crenshaw, Foreword: Toward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in Legal Education, 4 S. CAL. REV. 
L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 33, 35 n.4 (1994) (noting that “Blacks are likely to be somewhat aware 
that law has played a role in maintaining racial privilege” and that “Whites, although aware that 
racial subordination is a problem, are unlikely to view racism as a constant or central feature of 
American life”). 
133. See Ifill, supra note 38, at 97 (noting that “[d]iversity efforts are [often] 
countered with the argument that judges are impartial and thus need not be representative of 
particular racial groups”). Cf. David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Verdicts Matter: An Empirical 
Study of California Employment Discrimination and Wrongful Discharge Jury Verdicts Reveals 
Low Success Rates for Women and Minorities, 37 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 511, 542 (2003) 
(“‘When people are asked to describe themselves in a few words, [black] people invariably 
note their race and white people almost never do. Surveys tell us that virtually all [black] 
people notice the importance of race several times a day. White people rarely contemplate the 
fact of our whiteness—it is the norm, the given. It is a privilege to not have to think about 
race.’”) (quoting Sylvia A. Law, White Privilege and Affirmative Action, 32 AKRON L. REV. 
603, 604–05 (1999)); Ifill, supra note 15, at 424 (noting that Whites, in being considered the 
norm in society, have the privilege of seeing themselves as “neutral, unbiased, or impartial”). 
134. See Johnson & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 105 (manuscript at 30–38) 
(analogizing judges to juries and arguing that, much like with diversity of juries, “pulling a 
group of judges from a cross section of the community may . . . benefit the decision-making 
process”). As Magistrate Judge Edward Chen of the Northern District of California, the first 
Asian Pacific American to be named to the federal bench in that district, once asserted, the 
federal bench is incredibly lacking in diversity. As of September 30, 2001, out of nearly 1,600 
active federal judges, including Article III, magistrate, bankruptcy, and court of claims judges, 
only 7.2% were Blacks, 4.0% were Latino/as, 0.8% were Asian-Americans, 0.1% were Native 
Americans, and none were Pacific Islanders. See Chen, supra note 78, at 129 (noting that in 
“contrast, according to the 2000 census, African Americans were 12.3% of the U.S. population, 
Latinas/os were 12.5%, Asian Pacific Americans were 3.7%, and Native Americans were 
0.9%”). 
135. Wiley Henry, Judge Thomas Weathers Protest Storm, TRI-STATE DEFENDER, 
Aug. 5, 1998, at 1A (describing Judge Keith’s introduction of Justice Thomas at the National 
Bar Association Convention in 1998). 
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Keith, made important phone calls to Senators Orrin Hatch and Trent Lott to ensure 
the confirmation of U.S. District Judge Victoria Roberts, then a black female Clinton 
nominee whose nomination had been held up for a year by Republicans.136 
More importantly, racial diversity on the bench can actually help to secure 
impartiality “by ensuring that a single set of values or views do not dominate judicial 
decision-making.”137 Having judges of different races on the same court, especially on 
appellate courts where panels of judges decide cases, exposes each judge to different 
approaches and views on cases and can result in any one judge seeing an issue or 
point that the judge on his or her own may have disregarded. Indeed, such interaction 
may ultimately change the way in which a judge will vote and thus the outcome of a 
case.138 In sum, racial diversity on the court enhances judicial deliberations not only 
because it increases the chance of bringing different perspectives to the courtroom, but 
also because it likely influences the scope and manner of discourse amongst judges.139 
In fact, numerous studies have demonstrated how life experiences and the 
perspective from which a judge may analyze a case can affect his or her vote, 
particularly in non-unanimous cases.140 For example, in one such study of federal 
appellate courts between 1981 and 1996, Nancy Crowe, a Radcliffe Institute Fellow at 
                                                                                                                                      
136. See Kevin Merida & Michael A. Fletcher, Thomas’s Across-the-Aisle Aid 
Puzzles Even the Beneficiaries, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 2004, at A15; see also Merida & 
Fletcher, supra note 12 (stating that “Thomas has intervened or offered help on behalf of 
several stalled African-American judicial candidates” including Yale Law School classmate, 
Judge Eric Clay of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit). 
137. Ifill, supra note 15, at 411. See also RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, 
AND DEMOCRACY 94, 352–56 (2003) (“The nation contains such a diversity of moral and 
political thinking that the judiciary, if it is to retain its effectiveness, its legitimacy, has to be 
heterogeneous, and the members of a heterogeneous judicial community are not going to 
subscribe to a common set of moral and political dogmas that would make decisionmaking 
determinate.” (emphasis in original)).  
138. See Chen, supra note 78, at 136–38. But see Darrell Steffensmeier & Chester L. 
Britt, Judges’ Race and Judicial Decision Making: Do Black Judges Sentence Differently?, 82 
SOC. SCI. Q. 749, 749 (2001) (finding that there were small sentencing effects based on the race 
of the judge and that there was also much similarity in sentencing practices, although black 
judges were more likely to sentence both white and black offenders to prison). 
139. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 78, at 1159 (“People with different racial 
identities have different experiences and thus view the world differently”); Edwards, supra note 
97, at 329 (arguing that the presence of black judges changes our system of justice for the 
better). See also GERBER, supra note 10, at 6 (arguing that political preferences affect the 
jurisprudence of judges and asserting that “Justice Thomas’s acclimation period on the 
Supreme Court reveals . . . that judging and writing about judging are inherently political 
activities”). 
140. See Theresa M. Beiner, The Elusive (But Worthwhile) Quest for a Diverse Bench 
in the New Millennium, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 597, 601–10, 617 (2003) (describing several 
recent empirical studies concerning the effect of judges’ races on judicial decision-making but 
noting that “[i]n the majority of cases—many of which are routine and resolved by 
settlement—race and gender of the judge likely will not affect outcomes”). Cf. Edwards, supra 
note 97, at 329 (asserting that five to ten percent of cases can be categorized as hard and more 
likely to be influenced by a judge’s personal views). This is not to say that minority judges are 
any less impartial than white judges; to say that a judge brings a different perspective to a case 
does not mean that a judge fails to follow the law. See id. at 328.  
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Dartmouth College, found that the race of a judge could affect how he or she voted on 
race and sex discrimination cases.141 Overall, Crowe determined that black judges, 
because of the unique perspective they gain from experiences with racism,142 are more 
likely to vote for plaintiffs than white judges in both race and sex discrimination 
cases.143 Specifically, she found that black male judges are even more likely to vote 
for sex discrimination plaintiffs than white female judges.144 Moreover, Crowe 
concluded that there were noticeable differences in the voting behavior of black and 
white judges in race discrimination cases, with black judges voting for plaintiffs 
ninety percent of the time, while white judges voted for plaintiffs only forty-one 
percent of the time.145 Crowe, who also determined that partisanship played a strong 
role in judges’ votes on race discrimination cases,146 discovered that even black 
Republican judges were more likely to vote for a race discrimination plaintiff than a 
white male or female Democratic judge.147 In essence, Crowe found that a judge’s 
race and experiences with race could and did play a significant role in the way that a 
judge approached a case, interpreted issues, and, in some instances, reached a 
conclusion.148 
Likewise, Professor David Oppenheimer conducted a study of California 
employment law cases that revealed how race, specifically that of the juror, judge, or 
plaintiff, can affect the outcome of a case.149 Relying in part on previous studies 
                                                                                                                                      
141. Nancy E. Crowe, The Effects of Judges’ Sex and Race on Judicial Decision 
Making on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 1981–1996, at 80, 83 fig.3.1 (1999) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Chicago) (on file with the University of Chicago Library). But see 
Jennifer A. Segal, Representative Decision Making on the Federal Bench: Clinton’s District 
Court Appointees, 53 POL. RES. Q. 137, 144–46 tbls.2–3 (2000) (studying pairs of Clinton 
appointees based on race and/or gender and finding no statistically significant difference 
between black and white Clinton district court appointees). 
142. See Crowe, supra note 141, at 84 (“If African-American judges have 
experienced discrimination during their lifetimes, they may feel affinity for other victims of 
discrimination. . . . If the life experiences of African-Americans give them a unique perspective 
on discrimination, that perspective is apparently not limited to members of their own social 
group, it applies to others who find themselves similarly situated as well.”). 
143. See id. at xiii, 80, 83 fig.3.1 (reporting that “85 percent of the votes by African-
American judges were cast for plaintiffs, compared to 45 of the votes of white judges”). 
144. See id. at 83 fig.3.1. 
145. See id. at 137, 110–11, 114 fig.4.1. 
146. See id. at 80, 83 fig.3.1 (finding, for example, that a white male Republican 
judge voted for the sex discrimination plaintiff only twenty-eight percent of the time, while a 
white male Democratic judge voted for the plaintiff seventy-six percent of the time, and that 
white male Democratic judges voted for race discrimination plaintiffs forty-nine percent of the 
time while white male Republicans judges voted for the plaintiff only twenty percent of the 
time). 
147. Compared to black male Republican judges, who voted for the race 
discrimination plaintiff sixty percent of the time, white male Democratic judges voted for race 
discrimination plaintiffs only forty-nine percent of the time, and white female Democratic 
judges voted for the plaintiffs only slightly more at fifty-one percent. See Crowe, supra note 
141, at 114 fig.4.1. 
148. See id. at 80–84, 110–115, 83 fig.3.1, 114 fig.4.1. 
149. See Oppenheimer, supra note 133, at 513–17. 
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conducted by Professor Michael Selmi,150 Professor Oppenheimer determined that the 
fact that only 200 out of 1600 active federal judges were people of color played a role 
in the outcomes of discrimination cases tried between 1995 and 1997, verdicts in 
which plaintiffs had a success rate for plaintiffs of forty percent before a jury and only 
nineteen percent before a judge.151 He further concluded that the fact that seventy-
seven percent of all California Superior Court judges were white152 ultimately 
influenced how cases were shaped before state juries,153 which found for non-white 
plaintiffs in only thirty-six percent of all race discrimination cases as compared to 
fifty-three percent of all employment discrimination cases and in only twenty-five 
percent of race termination cases as compared to forty-seven percent of all termination 
cases.154 
In addition to these studies, several Supreme Court Justices have noted the 
way that one’s personal experience and attributes can influence judicial deliberations 
and decision-making.155 For example, Justice O’Connor once expressed to a group of 
female visitors at the Court that having Justice Ginsburg on the Court made “a night 
and day difference” for her.156 Furthermore, with respect to race, several Justices have 
remarked on the importance of the unique perspective that the late Justice Thurgood 
Marshall, the first racial minority to sit on the Court,157 brought to the bench.158 For 
example, Justice Lewis Powell once articulated how Justice Marshall’s “unique 
                                                                                                                                      
150. See Michael Selmi, Why are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to 
Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555 (2001). 
151. See Oppenheimer, supra note 133 at 558–59. 
152. See id. at 558. 
153. See id. at 558–59. 
154. See id. at 542–43. 
155. See Edwards, supra note 97, at 329 (“And in a judicial environment in which 
collegial deliberations are fostered, diversity among the judges makes for better-informed 
discussion. . . . A deliberative process enhanced by collegiality and a broad range of 
perspectives necessarily results in better and more nuanced opinions―opinions which, while 
remaining true to the rule of law, over time allow for a fuller and richer evolution of the law.”). 
But see Crowe, supra note 141, at 141-42, 153-57, 156 fig.5.2 (strangely finding that the 
presence of a black judge on a panel had a “negative impact on the decision making behavior of 
white male judges in race discrimination cases, [as a] panel composed entirely of white males 
was more likely to rule for a race discrimination plaintiff than a panel that included one African 
American judge”). 
156. Crowe, supra note 141, at 1 (citation omitted). The visitors were the women on 
the United States Olympic Basketball Team for 1996. See id. Justice O’Connor said to them, “I 
can’t tell you how happy I was when she [Justice Ginsburg] got to the court. It makes a night 
and day difference to have women on the bench.” Id. 
157. See Kevin R. Johnson, On Appointment of a Latina/o to the Supreme Court, 13 
BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 1, 3 (2002) (noting that Thurgood Marshall was the first black 
Supreme Court Justice). 
158. See, e.g., Julian Abele Cook, Jr., Dream Makers: Black Judges on Justice, 94 
MICH. L. REV. 1479, 1484 (1996) (quoting Justice Harry Blackmun as describing the “precious 
quality that the black justice had brought to the Court . . . [as] Marshall was the only justice 
who had ever defended a murder suspect . . . [and] [h]e was the only justice who had defended 
and worked with so many poor women that he actually knew how they suffered financially, 
were pained emotionally, [and] often became psychological wrecks over knowledge that 
another baby was on the way” (internal citation omitted)). 
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contribution” to the court derived from his “direct experience with racial segregation 
in this country.”159 Additionally, in her tribute to Justice Marshall in the Stanford Law 
Review, Justice O’Connor described how the late Justice “profoundly influence[d]” 
her, a woman who prior to Brown v. Board of Education160 had not been exposed to 
racial tensions and “had no personal sense . . . of being a minority in a society that 
cared primarily for the majority.”161 As O’Connor so vividly explained about the 
effect that Marshall had on the Court: 
Although all of us come to the Court with our own personal histories 
and experiences, Justice Marshall brought a special perspective. His 
was the eye of a lawyer who saw the deepest wounds in the social 
fabric and used law to help heal them. His was the ear of a counselor 
who understood the vulnerabilities of the accused and established 
safeguards for their protection. His was the mouth of a man who knew 
the anguish of the silenced and gave them a voice. At oral arguments 
and conference meetings, in opinions and dissents, Justice Marshall 
imparted not only his legal acumen but also his life experiences, 
constantly pushing and prodding us to respond not only to the 
persuasiveness of legal argument but also to the power of moral 
truth.162 
Similarly, the late Justice Byron White described the impact that Justice Marshall’s 
voice had on him as a jurist, noting: 
Thurgood brought to the conference table years of experience in an 
area that was of vital importance to our work, experience that none of 
us could claim to match. Thurgood could tell us the way it was, and he 
did so convincingly, often embellishing with humorous, sometimes 
hair-raising, stories straight from his own past. He characteristically 
would tell us things that we knew but would rather forget; and he told 
us that we did not know due to the limitations of our own experience.163 
                                                                                                                                      
159. BARBARA A. PERRY, A “REPRESENTATIVE” SUPREME COURT?: THE IMPACT OF 
RACE, RELIGION, AND GENDER ON APPOINTMENTS 137–38 (1991) (citing an interview with 
Justice Powell in which he argued that diversifying the bench with previously excluded groups 
can bring new insights to the court). 
160. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
161. O’Connor, supra note 41, at 1217. 
162. See id. at 1217 (emphasis added). 
163. Byron R. White, A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 44 STAN. L. REV. 
1215, 1216 (1992) (emphasis added); see also Johnson, supra 157, at 3 (quoting Justice 
Brennan as saying: “What made Thurgood Marshall unique as a Justice? Above all, it was the 
special voice that he added to the Court’s deliberations and decisions. His was a voice of 
authority: he spoke from first-hand knowledge of the law’s failure to fulfill its promised 
protections for so many Americans.”); Anthony M. Kennedy, The Voice of Thurgood Marshall, 
44 STAN. L. REV. 1221, 1221 (1992) (noting how Justice Marshall reminded the other Justices 
of their “moral obligation as a people to confront those tragedies of the human condition which 
continue to haunt even the richest and freest of countries”); cf. Ifill, supra note 15, at 448 
(detailing how Justice Ginsburg claimed that “female justices would compel the men to ‘[l]ook 
at life differently’”) (citing Ruth Bader Ginsburg Sworn in as Supreme Court Justice (CNN 
television broadcast, Aug. 10, 1993)). 
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Even Chief Justice Rehnquist, who often found himself on the opposite side 
of Marshall, has cited the late Justice’s “insightful perspective on key issues of our 
time” as a contribution to the Court.164  
Apart from the influence of diversity among their colleagues, judges can also 
be significantly influenced by insights they may gain from racial diversity in their 
personal lives. In fact, Dean Peter Alexander of Southern Illinois University School of 
Law described a rather compelling story about such effects on Chief Justice Warren 
before the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education.165 As Dean 
Alexander wrote in a speech presented as part of a commemoration of the fiftieth 
anniversary of Brown: 
Sometime before the Court announced the first of the Brown decisions, 
Chief Justice Warren decided to go to Virginia to tour Civil War sites. 
His Black chauffeur drove him from Washington, D.C., to the various 
sites. At the end of the first day, he checked into a hotel and assumed 
that his driver would do the same. The next day, the Chief Justice 
found his driver in the car and learned that he had spent the night not in 
a hotel but in the car because he couldn’t find accommodations for 
himself in segregated Virginia. Warren said of his reaction upon 
hearing this: “I was embarrassed, I was ashamed.”166 
No huge leaps are required to see that this cross-racial experience surely 
affected Chief Justice Warren, not only causing him to change his vacation plans by 
cutting his trip short and immediately returning to Washington, but perhaps his 
personal understanding of racism, for “[h]e had come as close as any White person 
could to the racial discrimination to which a Black man was commonly subjected and 
he did not like it.”167  
Although many persons may disagree with Justice Thomas’s philosophies 
and opinions, his presence on the Court supports a continuation of forward-looking 
affirmative action in the sense that he too brings a diverse perspective to the Court due 
to his racial background.168 In the same way that Justice Marshall brought a special 
perspective to the Court based on his personal experiences with racism,169 Justice 
                                                                                                                                      
164. William H. Rehnquist, Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 44 STAN. L. REV. 
1213, 1213 (1992).  
165. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In Brown, the Supreme Court held that segregation of 
children in public schools solely on the basis of race violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 493–95. 
166. Peter C. Alexander, From Brown to Topeka to the Future, 96 LAW LIBR. J. 219, 
221 (2004). 
167. Id. 
168. See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 1 (manuscript at 57–84) (demonstrating that 
Justice Thomas’s jurisprudence on certain issues is steeped in black conservative thought, 
which has a history and foundation that are distinct from white conservatism). See generally 
Mark Tushnet, supra note 24 (arguing that traces of black nationalism exist in Justice Thomas’s 
opinions). 
169. See Edwards, supra note 97, at 328 (“[B]lack judges may sometimes bring a 
unique vision to the judicial deliberative process. Because of the long history of racial 
discrimination and segregation in American society, it is safe to assume that a disproportionate 
number of blacks grow up with a heightened awareness of the problems that pertain to . . . areas 
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Thomas (who, by the way, is well-known for citing great black leaders such as 
Frederick Douglass and W.E.B. DuBois in his opinions)170 also brings a unique, black 
conservative perspective to the Court today.171 Indeed, as Justice Powell once spoke of 
Thurgood Marshall, some of Justice Thomas’s unique views stem from his 
experiences with racial segregation and discrimination.172 In fact, much like Justice 
Marshall, Justice Thomas has shared during deliberations a philosophy on 
desegregation that has clearly been shaped by his own personal experiences in Jim 
Crow schools.173 For example, during a conference on Missouri v. Jenkins,174 a case in 
which the Supreme Court determined that a desegregation order designed to attract 
more students from the suburbs was beyond the remedial authority of the district 
court,175 Justice Thomas passionately added:  
I am the only one at this table who attended a segregated school. . . . 
And the problem with segregation was not that we didn’t have white 
people in our class. The problem was that we didn’t have equal 
facilities. We didn’t have heating, we didn’t have books, and we had 
rickety chairs. All society owed us [were] equal resources and an equal 
opportunity to make something of ourselves. . . . The evil of 
segregation was that black students had inferior facilities, not that they 
were denied the chance to go to school with white students. . . . All my 
classmates and I wanted . . . was the choice to attend a mostly black 
school or mostly white school, and to have the same resources in 
whatever school we chose.176 
                                                                                                                                      
of the law,” such as equal opportunity and discrimination, standing, and criminal law). 
Additionally, although there has never been a Latino/a, Asian-American, or Native American 
Justice on the Court, a nominee from any of these racialized groups would also likely bring a 
“special” perspective to the Court. See Johnson & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 105 (manuscript 
at 9–12); Johnson, supra note 157, at 2–3, 7–14 (discussing how a Latino/a Justice may bring 
new perspectives to the Supreme Court). 
170. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349–50 (2003) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting a speech Frederick Douglass delivered to a 
group of abolitionists); United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 745 (1992) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (quoting W.E.B. DuBois).  
171. See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 1 (manuscript at 57–84) (demonstrating that 
Justice Thomas’s jurisprudence on certain issues is steeped in black conservative thought). 
172. My comparison of Justices Marshall and Thomas is not to suggest that Justice 
Thomas’s appointment or service on the Court has had the same impact as that of Justice 
Marshall, who could never be replaced. See Joan Biskupic, Thomas Caught Up in Conflict; 
Jurist’s Court Rulings, Life Experience Are at Odds, Many Blacks Say, WASH. POST, June 7, 
1996, at A20 (noting that Professor Stephen Carter, Yale Law School Professor and former law 
clerk to Justice Thurgood Marshall, has said that “many people still will not forgive [Thomas] 
for not being Thurgood Marshall” and that “Thomas was never going to be able to fill the shoes 
of the distinguished civil rights lawyer”). 
173. Cf. GERBER, supra note 10, at 198 (“Justice Thomas is . . . an especially 
fascinating example of the realist maxim that judges read their policy preferences into the law 
they are interpreting.”). 
174. 515 U.S. 70 (1995). 
175. See id. at 91–92. 
176. Jeffrey Rosen, Moving On, NEW YORKER, Apr. 29 & May 6, 1996, at 66. 
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While Justice Thomas was wrong to note that he was the only one to have attended a 
segregated school,177 his perspective on segregated schools was certainly unique 
among the other Justices at the table, many of whom may have attended segregated 
schools, but not because of their entire race’s perceived inferiority.178 To that end, 
Justice Thomas’s comments likely forced his peers to view the case from a different 
angle, thereby advancing one of the goals of affirmative action by shaping his 
colleagues’ approach to a case and enriching the discussion of legal issues.179 
Similarly, Justice Thomas brings to the Court a unique ideology on 
affirmative action, which has seemingly been influenced by his experiences at Yale 
Law School (whether consciously or unconsciously).180 In the past, Justice Thomas 
openly discussed his feelings about the stigma he believed affirmative action caused 
for him at Yale, describing his days there as trying to get a “monkey” off his back 
because he believed that his classmates felt he was there only because of his race.181 
These same points about stigma have materialized in Justice Thomas’s opinions on the 
Supreme Court. For example, in his concurring opinion in Adarand Constructors, Inc. 
v. Pena,182 Justice Thomas referred to what he believed to be the policy’s stigmatizing 
effects, claiming that affirmative action programs “stamp minorities with a badge of 
inferiority” and “engender attitudes of superiority or, alternatively, provoke 
resentment among those who believe that they have been wronged by the 
government’s use of race.”183  
Again, in Grutter, Justice Thomas reemphasized that he believed all 
minorities were considered undeserving because of affirmative action and asserted, 
perhaps thinking of how he has been perceived by much of the public,184 that there is 
always an open question of whether skin color played a role in the advancement of 
any high-achieving person of color.185 In fact, much like Justice Marshall, Justice 
Thomas has not been shy about sharing his views on affirmative action during 
deliberations, which undoubtedly have somewhat shaped the Justices’ discussions of 
these cases. For example, during deliberations on Adarand, Thomas used his personal 
experiences to appeal to his colleagues on the Court, discussing his life with his 
                                                                                                                                      
177. Of course, an all-white school is segregated, too. 
178. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (internal quotations omitted) 
(noting that racial segregation is “usually interpreted as denoting inferiority of the [N]egro 
group” and this “sense of inferiority . . . has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental 
development of [N]egro children”). 
179. See discussion supra Section I.A. 
180. See Mary Kate Kearney, Justice Thomas in Grutter v. Bollinger: Can Passion 
Play a Role in a Jurist’s Reasoning?, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 15, 32–35 (2004) (arguing that 
Justice Thomas’s personal experiences with affirmative action are evident in his jurisprudence 
and that they strengthen his voice in the debate). 
181. Williams, supra note 6, at 74. 
182. 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
183. Id. at 241 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
184. See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 1 (manuscript at 1–2 & nn.6–9) (stating that 
Thomas has repeatedly been described as lacking independent thought and has been referred to 
as Scalia’s clone, puppet, and even “bitch”). 
185. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 373 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
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grandfather and stating “[my] grandfather had worked hard, . . . he never asked for 
handouts from the state. He hadn’t made a great living, and his business had been 
restricted to black neighborhoods; but he had not needed affirmative action to get his 
contracts.”186 
Justice Thomas’s unique perspective can also be observed in his opinions on 
redistricting and voting rights. For example, in Holder v. Hall,187 Justice Thomas 
drafted a concurrence with a critical eye toward the role of race in drawing districting 
lines. In Holder, the Supreme Court held that a voting dilution challenge to a 
governing authority’s size under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 could not 
be maintained.188 Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment, argued that actions 
under the Voting Rights Act are restricted to eradicating practices that limit minority 
access to registering to vote and voting189 and criticized what he referred to as the 
“destructive assumptions” behind supporting majority-minority districts.190 Such 
assumptions, Thomas maintained, only result in what can be called “racial 
balkanization,”191 further the stereotype that “members of the racial group must think 
alike,” and emphasize “differences between candidates and voters that are 
irrelevant.”192 Justice Thomas further argued that such assumptions actually leave 
minorities susceptible to more harm because they ignore not only the individuality of 
each black voter but also the idea that a group of voters consisting of ten to twenty 
percent of the electorate in a district can significantly influence an election, and 
because they destroy any need for coalition building across racial lines.193 Moreover, 
Thomas contended, the assumptions work only to create white districts in which white 
representatives will not have to answer to minorities, actually diminishing minority 
                                                                                                                                      
186. Rosen, supra note 176, at 66. 
187. 512 U.S. 874 (1994).  
188. Id. at 882–85. 
189. Id. at 893–99 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
190. Id. at 894 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
191. Id. at 892, 905 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (“We have involved the 
federal courts, and indeed the Nation, in the enterprise of systematically dividing the country 
into electoral districts along racial lines—an enterprise of segregating the races into political 
homelands that amounts, in truth, to nothing short of a system of ‘political apartheid.’ Blacks 
are drawn into ‘black districts’ and given ‘black representatives’; Hispanics are drawn into 
Hispanic districts and given ‘Hispanic representatives’; and so on.”) (citing Wright v. 
Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 66 (1964) (Douglas, J., dissenting)) (internal citations omitted). 
192. Id. at 906 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); cf. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 
U.S. 234, 266–67 (2001) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[R]acial gerrymandering offends the 
Constitution whether the motivation is malicious or benign. It is not a defense that the 
legislature merely may have drawn the district based on the stereotype that blacks are reliable 
Democratic voters.”). But see Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Racial Identity, Electoral Structures, and 
the First Amendment Right of Association, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1209, 1229–45 (2003) 
(demonstrating through strong empirical evidence that Justice Thomas’s opinions concerning 
the relationship between racial identity and politics are incorrect); Chemerinsky, supra note 54, 
at 1175 (recognizing that “groups often share common interests and goals” and arguing that 
“drawing election lines to create majority . . . districts recognizes that such individuals are both 
individuals and members of a group, and that group identity can matter”). 
193. Holder, 512 U.S. at 900–01, 907 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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power.194 According to Justice Thomas, single-member majority-minority districts 
indicate only “‘how’ members of a minority are to control seats, but not ‘how many’ 
seats they should be allowed to control.”195 In essence, for Thomas, such districts 
dilute rather than strengthen minority voting power because they concentrate such 
power in a few districts as opposed to spreading smaller but influential pockets of it 
across many districts.196 
While no Justices have openly discussed the influence that Justice Thomas’s 
unique perspective may have had on them, his impact on the other Justices is 
becoming more noticeable. In fact, such impact was most evident in Virginia v. 
Black,197 a case involving a constitutional challenge to a state statute that made it a 
felony “for any person . . . with the intent of intimidating any person or group . . . to 
burn . . . a cross on the property of another, a highway or other public place.”198 
During oral argument, Justice Thomas, who rarely speaks during such proceedings,199 
                                                                                                                                      
194. Id. at 907 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (“‘Black-preferred’ 
candidates are assured election in ‘safe black districts’; white-preferred candidates are assured 
election in ‘safe white districts.’ Neither group needs to draw on support from the other’s 
constituency to win on election day. As one judge described the current trend of voting rights 
cases: ‘We are bent upon polarizing political subdivisions by race. The arrangement we 
construct makes it unnecessary, and probably unwise, for an elected official from a white 
majority district to be responsive at all to the wishes of black citizens; similarly, it is politically 
unwise for a black official from a black majority district to be responsive at all to white 
citizens.’”) (quoting United States v. Dallas County Comm’n, 850 F.2d 1443, 1444 (11th Cir. 
1988) (Hill, J., concurring) (emphasis added)). 
195. Id. at 902 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Reno v. Bossier 
Parrish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 491 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Such action necessarily 
decreases the level of minority influence in surrounding districts, and to that extent ‘dilutes’ 
the vote of minority voters in those other districts, and perhaps dilutes the influence of the 
minority group as a whole.”(emphasis in original)). In his movie FAHRENHEIT 9/11, (Lions Gate 
Films 2004), Michael Moore vividly displays the importance of actually having black faces in 
Congress. Moore’s film begins with a scene in which several minority members of the House 
of Representatives—eight black women, one Asian-American woman, and one black man—
objected to the ratification of Bush’s election to President. To have Bush’s election debated, 
each objector needed a signature from just one senator. As Moore demonstrated, no senator 
provided the required signature. It is worth noting that no senators at that time were black. See 
id. 
196. Stephen F. Smith, The Truth About Clarence Thomas and the Need for Black 
Leadership, 12 REGENT U. L. REV. 513, 547–48 (1999–2000) (defending Thomas’s philosophy 
on minority–majority districts); see also Carol M. Swain, Not “Wrongful” by Any Means: The 
Court’s Decisions in the Redistricting Cases, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 315, 320–21 (1997) (arguing 
that “minorities are in a win-win situation when they are positioned to influence more 
legislators than the handful they can elect when packed in oversized majority-minority 
districts”). 
197. 538 U.S. 343 (2003). 
198. Id. at 348; see also Brief Amici, supra note 21, at 97 (stating that “Justice 
Thomas’s perspective clearly altered the consideration of the case, and brought insights that 
were necessary to properly weigh the issues at stake”). 
199. See Cross Burning Case Draws Thomas’ Ire, JET MAG., Jan. 6, 2003, at 26 
(describing Justice Thomas as “[n]ormally stoic and silent during arguments”); Dahlia 
Lithwick, Personal Truths and Legal Fictions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2002, at A35 (noting that 
146 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 47:113 
 
 
interrupted the attorney for the petitioner to express his understanding of a burning 
cross as having no purpose other than to “cause fear” and “to terrorize a 
population.”200 Justice Thomas’s view was that of a black man who grew up in the Jim 
Crow South, with its history of lynchings and racial terrorism.201 He asserted: 
Now, it’s my understanding that we had almost 100 years of lynching 
and activity in the South by the Knights of Camellia and—and the Ku 
Klux Klan, and this was a reign of terror and the cross was a symbol of 
that reign of terror. Was—isn’t that significantly greater than 
intimidation or a threat?202 
As many reporters noted, the mood of the argument changed after Justice 
Thomas’s dialogue with Dreeben.203 As one commentator noted, “Thomas’[s] 
exasperated outburst changed the course of the debate, with several justices voicing 
agreement and acknowledging that cross burning in America is a unique symbol.”204 
For example, Justices O’Connor and Scalia, both of whom voted in favor of the 
constitutionality of the statute, made several comments following up on Justice 
Thomas’s analysis. For instance, Justice Scalia stated, “Yes. I dare say . . . [i]f you 
were a black man at night, you’d rather see a man with a rifle than see a burning cross 
on your front lawn. . . . The whole purpose of that is—is to terrorize.”205 Likewise, 
having earlier referred to the “reasons we’ve explored this morning” (meaning 
Justice’s Thomas’s statements),206 Justice O’Connor asserted, “[a]nd so the question 
before us is whether burning a cross is such a terrorizing symbol in . . . American 
culture that even on the basis of heightened scrutiny, it’s okay to proscribe it.”207 Even 
Justice Ginsburg, who ultimately dissented from the majority and also from Justice 
Thomas’s view, distinguished the cross from other symbols, declaring, “[b]ut the cross 
                                                                                                                                      
Justice Thomas “speaks only four or fives times a year, less often than most of his colleagues 
speak during an average morning”). 
200. Transcript at Oral Argument at 21, Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2002) (No. 
01-1107). 
201. Lithwick, supra note 199, at A35 (noting that Justice Thomas “let loose with a 
personal accounting of what a burning cross means to a black man in America”). 
202. Transcript at Oral Argument at 20, Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2002) (No. 
01-1107). 
203. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, An Intense Attack by Justice Thomas on Cross-
Burning, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2002, at A1 (reporting that court’s “mood appeared to have 
changed” after Justice Thomas spoke).  
204. Patty Reinert, High Court Upholds Cross Burning Ban, HOUS. CHRON., Apr. 8, 
2003, at 01. 
205. Transcript at Oral Argument at 28, Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2002) (No. 
01-1107); Lithwick, supra note 199 (reporting the same). But see Guy-Uriel Charles, Colored 
Speech: Cross Burnings, Epistemics, and the Triumph of the Crits?, 93 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 
2005) (manuscript at 56 n.320, on file with Author) (“I cannot help but note that I do not know 
whether other black men (or black women) would rather see a (presumably white) man on their 
lawn at night with a rifle than one with a burning cross. But I do know that while this black 
man would prefer neither; if I must choose, I would take the burning cross. To the extent that 
the burning cross is a harbinger of things to come, the rifle is the real event.”). 
206. Transcript at Oral Argument at 29, Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2002) (No. 
01-1107). 
207. Id. at 34. 
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is not attacking the government. It’s attacking people, threatening their lives and 
limbs. . . . I think you have to separate the symbol that is the burning cross from other 
symbols that are critical of government, but that don’t—that aren’t a threat to personal 
safety.”208 Similarly, Justice Souter, who drafted the dissent in the case, once asked 
Rodney Smolla, attorney for the respondents, “[b]ut . . . isn’t your argument an 
argument that would have been sound before the cross, in effect, acquired the history 
that it has? . . . How does your argument account for the fact that the cross has 
acquired a potency which I would suppose is at least as equal to that of the gun?”209  
In the end, the majority rejected Justice Thomas’s view that laws prohibiting 
cross burning with the intent to intimidate target vicious conduct, and not speech.210 
But the Court did hold, however, that the Virginia statute constitutionally limited a 
form of expression that had posed an imminent threat of harm and that the statute did 
not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint because it restricted any form of cross 
burning, regardless of whom it targeted.211 Moreover, it was clear that Justice 
Thomas’s speech about cross burning as part of a “reign of terror”212 had a profound 
impact on Justice O’Connor’s opinion,213 with the Court, as some have argued, 
rendering a decision that was at odds with its precedent214 in R.A.V. v. City of St. 
Paul215 and with O’Connor beginning the Court’s opinion with an entire section 
devoted to the historical meaning of cross burnings in the United States.216 Clearly, 
Justice Thomas and his unique perspective impacted the way the other Justices 
approached the case, forcing them to view the cause of action from a different angle, 
even if they ultimately rejected his analysis.217 By the same token, it is likely that 
other comments Justice Thomas has made during deliberations at the Court have had a 
similar impact on the manner in which his colleagues have discussed and analyzed 
                                                                                                                                      
208. Id. at 46. 
209. Id. at 30–31. 
210. 538 U.S. at 394 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]his statute prohibits only conduct, 
not expression. And, just as one cannot burn down someone’s house to make a political point 
and then seek refuge in the First Amendment, those who hate cannot terrorize and intimidate to 
make their point.”). 
211. Id. at 363. 
212. Transcript at Oral Argument at 20, Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2002) (No. 
01-1107). 
213. See Paul Brest, Diversity Gives Depth to the Law, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2003, at 
B13 (“While most white members of the Supreme Court understand the message conveyed by 
cross burning, reports of the recent oral argument in the cross-burning case suggest that the 
justices were given a new perspective after listening to Justice Clarence Thomas’ passionate 
description from the bench.”). 
214. See Charles, supra note 205 (manuscript at 29–34) (arguing that Virginia v. 
Black represents a complete course reversal with respect to the Court’s approach to the 
constitutionality of anti-cross burning statutes); Reinert, supra note 204, at 01 (asserting that 
the “decision appeared to conflict with the high’s court’s previous rulings”). 
215. 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
216. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. at 352–59 (describing the history of the burning 
cross and the Ku Klux Klan in the United States); see also Charles, supra note 205 (manuscript 
at 45). 
217. See Charles, supra note 205 (manuscript at 41–44) (arguing how the epistemic 
authority that Justice Thomas held as black man who could uniquely feel the harms of cross 
burning framed the disposition of Virginia v. Black). 
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other cases, thereby enhancing the judicial process218 and again boosting one of the 
primary goals of forward-looking affirmative action.219 
B. Voices Within 
In addition to buttressing pro-affirmative action arguments concerning the 
benefits of interracial diversity of perspective among judges, Justice Thomas’s seat 
and performance on the Court also support pro-affirmative action claims regarding 
gains from non-minorities’ exposure to intraracial diversity of perspective. 
Specifically, Justice Thomas’s presence and conservative political views shatter any 
stereotypes about the existence of a monolithic minority viewpoint220 and perceptions 
that minority judges are automatically biased against white litigants, a view that has 
led to many unfounded requests for recusal of black judges.221 
Indeed, it is no secret that Justice Thomas’s views on many issues that 
concern race are widely disparate from those of many Blacks, most notably the late 
Justice Marshall.222 For the Justices who served on the bench during Justice 
Marshall’s tenure and who now serve on the bench with Justice Thomas, the 
difference between the only two racial minorities to sit on the Supreme Court must be 
striking.  
If nothing else, Justice Thomas surely destroys the myth that there is only 
one “black voice” and that all Blacks think alike and stick together.223 Indeed, whereas 
Justice Thomas, the second black justice on the Court, vehemently opposes 
                                                                                                                                      
218. See supra Part II.A & notes 133–36. 
219. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
220. See Chen, supra note 78, at 135 (noting that diversity in general helps to “dispel 
traditional stereotypes that Asian Pacific Americans and other minorities are not sufficiently 
intelligent, articulate, or decisive to be judges”); Edwards, supra note 97, at 327–28 (stating 
that “there is no overriding ‘black perspective’ on which black judges rely in their decision 
making”). 
221. In the past, litigants have challenged the impartiality of minority judges where 
discrimination was at issue, a burden that black judges continue to face. See, e.g., Blank v. 
Sullivan & Cromwell, 418 F. Supp. 1, 2–4, 10 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (involving a request for recusal 
of Judge Constance Baker Motley in a gender discrimination case against a law firm and the 
judge’s response that “if background or sex or race of each judge were, by definition, sufficient 
grounds for removal, no judge on this court could hear the case, or many others, by virtue of 
the fact that all of them [are] attorneys, of a sex, often with distinguished law firm or public 
service backgrounds”); Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, 388 F. Supp. 155, 165–79 (E.D. Pa. 
1974) (concerning the request for a recusal of Judge Leon Higginbotham in a union 
discrimination case, where the judge declared that there was no conflict between impartiality 
and being black and expressing solidarity with one’s community). 
222. See Johnson & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 105 (manuscript at 9–12, 47–48, 50) 
(“Although both are African American, Thurgood Marshall and Clarence Thomas approach the 
law from dramatically different perspectives and could be expected to reach different 
conclusions in the same cases.”). 
223. See Edwards, supra note 97, at 327 (asserting that the range of political and 
ideological positions among black lawyers is staggering); Ifill, supra note 15, at 421 (noting 
that “[t]he black community has never been monolithic in its view of how best to advance its 
collective economic, political, and social interests”). 
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affirmative action, Justice Marshall, the first black justice, was its champion.224 For 
example, in his dissent in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,225 a case in which the 
Court struck down a construction set-aside program benefiting minorities,226 Justice 
Marshall indicated that the Court’s decision “mark[ed] a deliberate and giant step 
backward in the Court’s affirmative-action jurisprudence.”227 Unlike Justice Thomas, 
who has asserted that there can be no distinctions “between laws designed to 
subjugate a race and those that distribute benefits on the basis of race,”228 Justice 
Marshall argued the exact opposite in Croson, stating that “[a] profound difference 
separates governmental actions that themselves are racist, and governmental actions 
that seek to remedy the effects of prior racism or to prevent neutral governmental 
activity from perpetuating the effects of such racism.”229 While some may find Justice 
Thomas’s opinions to be personally distasteful, there is no arguing that his presence 
makes clear that no one black person can enlighten others as to what all Blacks may 
think.230 
In fact, the divergence between Justice Thomas’s and Justice Marshall’s 
views—and in many respects, the views of the vast majority of Blacks231—is not 
limited to affirmative action alone.232 Perhaps the two black Justices’ most notable 
                                                                                                                                      
224. See Why Clarence Thomas Doesn’t Deserve a Black Forum: NO PLACE AT 
THE TABLE, EMERGE, Sept. 1998, at 58 (“Justice Marshall believed that affirmative action was 
helpful to minorities and women, while Justice Thomas views it as a cancer to be eradicated.”). 
225. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
226. Id. at 498–510. The Court held that the City had failed to show its past 
discrimination against the minority beneficiaries of the program and had not narrowly tailored 
its program to remedy the past effects of discrimination. Id. 
227. Id. at 529 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
228. Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240 (1995) (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
229. Croson, 488 U.S. at 551–52 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
230. See Emily Calhoun, An Essay on the Professorial Responsibility of Affirmative 
Action in Higher Education, 12 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2002) (discussing the 
burdens on “token” minority students in classrooms and detailing the pressures of being 
expected to represent one’s race). 
231. See, e.g., Poll: Public Split on Affirmative Action, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 7, 
2003 (stating that eighty-nine percent of Blacks still think affirmative action programs are 
necessary).  
232. One commentator has described what he viewed as a striking difference between 
the two Justices in a 1996 case that Thomas has referred to as his favorite, Norfolk & W. Ry. 
Co. v. Hiles, 516 U.S. 400 (1996). That case involved Williams Hiles, a switchman, who 
sought to recover damages for injuries he sustained while adjusting a misaligned drawbar 
between two cars. Id. Hiles’s actions, referred to as coupling, “accounted for 11 of the 76 
deaths among railroad workers during a recent six-year period.” Tony Mauro, Decade After 
Confirmation, Thomas Becoming a Force on High Court, FULTON CTY. DAILY REP., Aug. 20, 
2001, at 1. In ruling on Hiles’s claim, the Supreme Court, in a decision written by Justice 
Thomas, held that the railroad was not liable under the Safety Appliance Act for the injuries 
Hiles sustained while straightening a misaligned drawbar, a decision which made it harder for 
railroad workers, many of whom are Black, to recover damages for such accidents. As the 
commentator noted about Justice Thomas’s decision and how it would likely differ from one of 
Justice Marshall, “‘Justice Thomas is proud of a decision that makes the railroad workplace 
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differences are exhibited in their opinions on crime-related matters.233 While 
Thurgood Marshall’s opinions are known for the manner in which they maintained a 
regard for the rights of prisoners and for criminal defendants’ right to a fair trial,234 
Justice Thomas’s criminal jurisprudence has earned him nicknames such as “[t]he 
youngest, cruelest justice”235 and “Clarence the Cruel.”236 Thomas first earned this 
reputation as the “cruelest justice” when he issued a dissent in Hudson v. 
McMillian,237 where he argued that an inmate’s beating by two prison guards, which 
bruised the inmate’s face, loosened his teeth, blackened his eye, burst his lip, and 
cracked his dental plate, did not violate the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause238—a vote that all agree Justice Marshall never would have cast.239 
Additionally, unlike Justice Marshall, who asserted in his concurrence in Batson v. 
Kentucky240 that the racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in jury 
                                                                                                                                      
less safe. Not to inject race into it, but Thurgood Marshall would have known the consequences 
of the decision to African-Americans in a heartbeat.’” Id. (emphasis added).  
233. Justice Thomas’s criminal law jurisprudence holds true to his philosophy that “a 
criminal justice system is to hold people accountable for the consequences of their actions.” 
Hon. Clarence Thomas, Keynote Address, 1 MICH. L. & POL’Y REV. 269, 271–76 (1996) 
(discussing how he perceives the criminal justice system should be affected by the ideal of 
personal responsibility). 
234. See generally Melvin Gutterman, The Prison Jurisprudence of Justice Thurgood 
Marshall, 56 MD. L. REV. 149 (1997) (discussing Justice Marshall’s prison jurisprudence and 
how such jurisprudence reflected his passion for prison reform). 
235. Editorial, The Youngest, Cruelest Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1992, at A24. 
236. Derrick Z. Jackson, Thomas’s Cruel View of Prisoners, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 28, 
2003, at A19; see, e.g., Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 40–42 (1993) (arguing that the 
Court should overrule Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), which established that “deliberate 
indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners” violates the Eighth Amendment). Cf. 
Christopher E. Smith, The Constitution and Criminal Punishment: The Emerging Visions of 
Justices Scalia and Thomas, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 593, 599–610 (1995) (discussing Justice 
Thomas’s jurisprudence on Eighth Amendment, death penalty, and habeas corpus cases). 
237. 503 U.S. 1 (1992). 
238. Id. at 18 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Professor Stephen Smith of the University of 
Virginia School of Law has made clear that Justice Thomas did not argue “that beating 
prisoners is acceptable conduct that is permitted by the Constitution.” See Smith, supra note 
196, at 539. As Professor Smith highlighted the following: 
Importantly, in concluding that the Eighth Amendment afforded no basis 
for relief, Justice Thomas emphasized that “if available state remedies were 
not constitutionally adequate, [the prisoner] would have a claim [for relief] 
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment” and stated 
that he “agree [d]” that the Due Process Clause “is the appropriate, and 
appropriately limited, federal constitutional inquiry in this case.” 
Id. at 540. 
239. See Hon. Julian Abele Cook, Jr., Thurgood Marshall and Clarence Thomas: A 
Glance at Their Philosophies, 73 MICH. B.J. 298, 300–01 (1994) (asserting that the two Justices 
had strong differences in opinion on the rights of an individual under the Eighth Amendment). 
Cf. Note, Lasting Stigma: Affirmative Action and Clarence Thomas’s Prisoners’ Rights 
Jurisprudence, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1341–47 (1999) (concluding that Justice Thomas’s 
conservative jurisprudence is in part due to his attempts to distinguish himself from Justice 
Marshall).  
240. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
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selection is so inescapable that peremptories should be banned entirely,241 Justice 
Thomas argued in a dissent in Miller-El v. Cockrell242 that the petitioner had failed to 
demonstrate that reasonable jurists could debate whether he provided clear and 
convincing evidence to prove racial discrimination in the use of peremptory 
challenges.243 Justice Thomas made this argument in the face of the majority’s 
determination that the petitioner had proved the plausibility of his underlying 
constitutional claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) by producing historical evidence of 
a memorandum that ordered attorneys in Dallas District Attorney’s Office not to allow 
Blacks and Mexican-Americans on the jury244 and evidence showing that ninety-one 
percent of eligible black jurors were excluded245 from the petitioner’s venire.246 
In all, the distinctions between Justice Marshall’s and Justice Thomas’s 
judicial careers, and between Justice Thomas’s political views and those of many 
                                                                                                                                      
241. Id. at 102–08 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“Merely allowing defendants the 
opportunity to challenge the racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in individual 
cases will not end the illegitimate use of the peremptory challenge. . . . Even if all parties 
approach the Court’s mandate with the best of conscious intentions, that mandate requires them 
to confront and overcome their own racism on all levels—a challenge I doubt all of them can 
meet.”). 
242. 537 U.S. 322 (2003). 
243. Id. at 354–70 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
244. The 1963 circular read, “Do not take Jews, Negroes, Dagos, Mexicans or a 
member of any minority race on a jury, no matter how rich or how well educated.” Id. at 334–
35, 346–47 (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Batson, 476 U.S. at 104 
(Marshall, J., concurring) (ironically citing to the instruction book in the same Dallas County at 
issue in Miller-El, which advised prosecutors to conduct jury selection so as to “eliminate ‘any 
member of a minority group’”). 
245. Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 331, 342 (“Of the 11 African-American jurors remaining 
[after removals for cause], . . . all but 1 were excluded by peremptory strikes exercised by the 
prosecutors. . . . In contrast the prosecutors used their peremptory strikes against just 13% (4 
out of 31) of the eligible nonblack prospective jurors qualified to serve on petitioner’s jury. . . . 
In total, 10 of the prosecutors’ 14 peremptory strikes were used against African-Americans.”). 
246. Other evidence presented included the fact that three of the State’s proffered 
race-neutral rationales for striking African Americans—“ambivalence about the death penalty; 
hesitancy to vote to execute defendants capable of being rehabilitated, and the jurors’ own 
family history of criminality”—pertained just as well to some white jurors who were not 
challenged and who did serve on the jury and that fact the State used racially disparate 
questioning. Id. at 343; see, e.g., id. at 332, 344–45 (“Most African-Americans (53% percent, 
or 8 out of 15) were first given a detailed description of the mechanics of an execution in 
Texas. . . . Only then were these African-American venire members asked whether they could 
render a decision leading to a sentence of death. Very few prospective white jurors (6%, or 3 
out of 49) were given this preface prior to being asked for their views on capital punishment.”). 
One more convincing piece of evidence was proof that state courts failed to consider the 
evidence of the prosecution’s use of the jury shuffle. See id. at 334–35, 346 (“This practice 
permits parties to rearrange the order in which members of the venire are examined so as to 
increase the likelihood that visually preferable venire members will be moved forward and 
empanelled. . . . On at least two occasions the prosecution requested shuffles when there were a 
predominant number of African-Americans in the front of the panel.”); see also Michael M. 
Gallagher, Abolishing the Texas Jury Shuffle, 35 ST. MARY’S L.J. 303, 312–19 (2004) (arguing 
that the jury shuffle has outlived its usefulness and that Texas should join the forty-nine other 
states that disallow its use). 
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members of the black community, advance the goal of affirmative action by breaking 
down stereotypes about the lack of diversity in minority perspectives.247 They 
highlight differences among Blacks in both their experiences and views in a way that 
can enhance the learning process both in schools and in jobs.248 For example, as 
Professors Paul Brest and Miranda Oshige once acknowledged, the inclusion of even 
affluent Blacks in affirmative action programs can be as beneficial as the participation 
of poor Blacks,249 as “the experiences of growing up . . . as an affluent African 
American in the United States are nonetheless quite different from growing up white” 
or from growing up black and poor.250  
In sum, although the benefits of including Justice Thomas’s “raced” 
jurisprudence are highly debatable in light of the fact that his views could potentially 
result in a greater number of decisions that most Blacks view as harmful,251 there is a 
benefit to Justice Thomas’s standing as a symbol to the general public of the array of 
viewpoints among Blacks and other minorities in the United States.252 His presence 
alone helps to destroy the idea that all Blacks think and act alike. Destroying the 
perception of uniformity in views among Blacks is positive in the sense that it not 
only breaks down stereotypes but also opens the door for discussions about differing 
viewpoints within the black community.253 As Nobel Prize-winning novelist Toni 
Morrison explained about Thomas’s confirmation (even though she was not one of his 
supporters), “something positive and liberating has surfaced” because the clear 
exposure of differences of thought among black people made it possible, if not 
necessary, to speak about race matters without “the barriers, the silences, the 
embarrassing gaps in discourse.”254 Indeed, Thomas’s nomination to the Supreme 
Court reinitiated an awareness of the range of black political thought, an awareness 
                                                                                                                                      
247. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY 6, 34–
37 (1991) (discussing the need for a focus on genuine diversity that does not deny black 
individuality); WILLIAMS, supra note 115, at 103, 121 (same). 
248. Brest & Oshige, supra note 81, at 876. 
249. Id. To my mind, however, if choosing between a poor black applicant and a 
wealthy black applicant of similar qualifications (however broadly that is defined), one should 
select the poor black applicant, whose successes at that point may indicate a will to succeed 
that is valuable in any school or job; cf. Angela I. Onwuachi-Willig, Note, Moving Ground, 
Breaking Traditions: Tasha’s Chronicle, 3 MICH. J. RACE & L. 255, 272–73 (1997) (arguing 
that a person who came from an economically disadvantaged background or overcame many 
obstacles just to obtain an education could become a particularly tenacious lawyer). 
250. Brest & Oshige, supra note 81, at 876. 
251. See discussion infra Conclusion. 
252. See Carol M. Swain, Double Standard, Double Bind: African-American 
Leadership After the Thomas Debacle, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON 
ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 215, 228–29 
(Toni Morrison ed., 1992) (citing the revelation of a diversity of black opinion as a positive, 
but describing how she ultimately came to oppose Thomas’s nomination because of his 
willingness to cry “race, race, race” when the pressure was on). 
253. In this section, I do not mean to suggest that the benefit that stems from 
exposure to interracial diversity of viewpoint outweighs any negatives that come from the 
results of Justice Thomas’s votes on the Court. See infra Conclusion. 
254. See Toni Morrison, Introduction: Friday on the Potomac, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, 
EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
SOCIAL REALITY vii–xxx (Toni Morrison ed., 1992). 
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that had been absent from the media since the disputes between civil rights activists 
who preached non-violence and black nationalists, such as the Black Panthers, who 
sought freedom, justice, and equality by any means necessary. By doing so, it may 
make it more possible for Blacks, as Professor Richard Delgado has argued, to 
reconfigure strategies on civil rights issues that “take account of a complex 
fragmented racial reality in which [different groups of Blacks] have differing goals 
and needs.”255 
C. Working the Right Way  
Finally, Justice Thomas himself makes the case for affirmative action 
because he exposes the weaknesses of traditional standards of merit, both through his 
performance on the Court and, ironically enough, through his own opinions, 
specifically his dissent in Grutter. In so doing, he adds legitimacy to the demand for a 
re-parameterization of merit standards. For example, although Clarence Thomas 
arguably had not achieved similar distinction in his schooling and his career as his 
fellow Justices at the time of his appointment,256 he, as several scholars have 
maintained, has performed on a level equal to his peers—establishing his own voice 
and philosophies on the way.257 Indeed, in a prior article, I respond to criticisms that 
Justice Thomas is a “Scalia clone” by demonstrating how Justice Thomas, through his 
jurisprudence, does not follow Justice Scalia but instead participates in America’s 
long history of black conservative thought.258 Moreover, as the years have passed, the 
quiet Thomas has developed respect among and gained serious attention from 
numerous scholars.259 For example, Professor Scott Gerber has dedicated a significant 
part of his career to studying Justice Thomas and praises the Justice for his fiercely 
independent voice and adherence to individualistic color-blind constitutionalism.260 
Likewise, others have applauded the Justice for his defense of the First 
Amendment.261 Even liberals, such as Professors Guy-Uriel Charles and Mark 
Tushnet (and even myself), have warned that scholars should pay particular attention 
to the ways in which Justice Thomas’s voice is “raced” and that Justice Thomas 
                                                                                                                                      
255. Richard Delgado, Enormous Anomaly? Left-Right Parallels in Recent Writing 
About Race, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1547, 1555 (1991) (book review). 
256. See discussion supra Introduction. 
257. See Scott D. Gerber, Sen. Reid v. Justice Thomas, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2004, 
at A13; Mauro, supra note 232, at 1 (asserting that Justices Thomas and Scalia have different 
approaches to originalism); see also Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 1 (manuscript at 57–84) 
(contrasting Justice Thomas’s jurisprudence with Justice Scalia’s). 
258. See generally Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 1 (manuscript at 57–84). 
259. See Mauro, supra note 232, at 1 (asserting that Justice Thomas “has defined a 
deep, clearly personal jurisprudence anchored in originalism that is receiving some scholarly 
respect”). 
260. See generally GERBER, supra note 10; Gerber, supra note 11, at 63. 
261. See, e.g., Michael A. Fletcher & Kevin Merida, Jurist Embraces Image as a 
Hard-Line Holdout, WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 2004, at A1(asserting that “Thomas has been one of 
the amendment’s staunchest defenders on the court”); David L. Hudson, Justice Clarence 
Thomas: The Emergence of Commercial-Speech Protector, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 485, 486–87 
(2002) (claiming that Justice Thomas is a more forceful advocate for commercial speech than 
his predecessor Justice Marshall). 
154 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 47:113 
 
 
himself is a force to be reckoned with.262 For example, Thomas has been described 
“‘as a right-wing intellectual force in his own right, a radical conservative capable of 
spinning out bold, well-researched legal essays in clear, provocative prose.’”263 
Indeed, the young black Justice may become the Supreme Court’s next Chief Justice, 
which would also make him the first black Chief Justice.264 
Most of all, Thomas’s appointment to the Court itself tested traditional 
notions of “qualifications” to serve on the Court. In defending Thomas’s nomination 
to the Court, Thomas’s advocates highlighted various forms of “non-traditional” 
criteria, in particular his life experiences and unique perspective based on those 
experiences, as important contributions to the Court.265 In so doing, Thomas’s largely 
Republican supporters ironically conceded the ways in which traditional definitions of 
merit can be non-neutral and arbitrarily serve to exclude people of color. In essence, 
by declaring that Thomas was the “best man for the job,”266 his supporters admitted, 
even if only for political reasons, that traditional notions of merits can and should be 
re-parameterized. 
More importantly, the language in Justice Thomas’s opinions uncovers the 
way in which affirmative action can challenge strict adherence to traditional standards 
of merit. In fact, Justice Thomas challenged reliance on such standards in his dissent 
in Grutter.267 For example, he acknowledged the inadequacy of traditional merit 
standards, stating: 
                                                                                                                                      
262. See Scott D. Gerber, “My Rookie Years Are Over”: Clarence Thomas After Ten 
Years, 10 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 343, 348 (2002) (reporting that “[s]ome liberals 
are now willing to admit that [Justice Thomas] has many interesting things to say”); see, e.g., 
Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 1 (manuscript at 75–81); Charles, supra note 205 (manuscript at 
34–39); Tushnet, supra note 24, at 339. But see Fletcher & Merida, supra note 261(arguing that 
Justice Thomas is not a persuasive force on the court because his “unbending approach makes 
it difficult to assign him opinions in closely contested cases for fear that he might not be able to 
hold a majority”). 
263. GERBER supra note 10, at 25. 
264. See KEN FOSKETT, JUDGING THOMAS: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF CLARENCE THOMAS 
4 (2004). Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid recently asserted his opposition to Justice 
Thomas being appointed Chief Justice. In so doing, Senator Reid declared that Justice Thomas 
is an “embarrassment” to the Court while proclaiming that Justice Scalia is suitable for the 
position because he “is one smart guy.” Zev Chafets, Editorial, Slap at Thomas Stinks of 
Racism, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 8, 2004, at 43; Michael A. Fletcher, Reid Says He Could Back 
Scalia for Chief Justice; Comments Anger Liberals and Thomas Supporters, WASH. POST, Dec. 
7, 2004, at A04. Some commentators have highlighted how the Senator’s strikingly different 
opinions of the two conservative justices may be influenced by the stereotype of black 
incompetence. See Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Clarence Thomas as Chief Justice?, CHI. TRIB., 
Jan. 2, 2005, at 9. 
265. See Murray, supra note 43, at 374–85 (describing how the debate regarding 
Thomas’s appointment expanded the criteria that was reviewed in the vote on his nomination to 
the Court). 
266. See GREENYA, supra note 6, at 171 (stating that President Bush was supposed to 
refer to Judge Thomas as the “best man” for the job instead of the “best qualified”); Wells, 
supra note 20, at 121.  
267. Derrick Bell, Diversity’s Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1629–30 
(2003) (noting that Justice Thomas knows the admissions process is not based on merit). 
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[T]here is much to be said for the view that the use of tests and other 
measures to “predict” academic performance is a poor substitute for a 
system that gives every applicant a chance to prove he can succeed in 
the study of law. The rallying cry that in the absence of racial 
discrimination in admissions there would be a true meritocracy ignores 
the fact that the entire process is poisoned by numerous exceptions to 
“merit.”268 
After pointing out that the practice of legacy admissions flies in the face of 
true merit, Justice Thomas identified what he viewed as the real problem: the 
University of Michigan’s refusal to abandon its use of the LSAT,269 a test that is 
known to produce racially disproportionate results.270 Justice Thomas then expressed 
his belief that the law school was not “looking for those students, who despite a lower 
LSAT score or undergraduate grade point average, will succeed in the study of law,” 
but rather was only trying to create a class that looked right.271 In all, Justice Thomas 
called for the Court to require the elite institution to re-evaluate its admissions 
process.272 Although at times Justice Thomas’s words indicate an acceptance of sorts 
of the use of standardized tests such as the LSAT,273 supporters of affirmative action 
should accept the Justice’s call for a re-parameterization of the school’s standards as a 
welcome plea for forcing a change in the way merit is defined in general. 
CONCLUSION 
For the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house. 
—Audre Lorde274 
As demonstrated above, Justice Thomas, in a sense, makes the case for 
affirmative action. His unique and, in many ways, “raced” perspective on legal issues 
highlights the benefits of including a broad range of voices in our schools, 
                                                                                                                                      
268. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 367–78 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
269. Id. at 369–70 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“Nevertheless, law schools continue to use the test and then attempt to ‘correct’ for black 
underperformance by using racial discrimination in admissions so as to obtain their aesthetic 
student body.”). 
270. See William C. Kidder, Does the LSAT Mirror or Magnify Racial and Ethnic 
Differences in Educational Attainment? A Study of Equally Achieving ‘Elite’ College Students, 
89 CAL. L. REV. 1055, 1073–85 (2001) (concluding that the LSAT systematically 
disadvantages minority law school applicants). 
271. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 369–70 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
272. Id. at 366 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that 
“before being given license to use racial discrimination, the Law School [should] be required to 
radically reshape its admissions process”). 
273. See id. at 372 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (implicitly 
asserting that the LSAT is a valid measure of success in law school when he stated that the law 
school admitted unprepared students who find themselves overmatched in the law school and 
outperformed by their white peers). 
274. LORDE, supra note 1, at 112. 
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workplaces, and even in our courts.275 His dissenting voice from many individuals in 
the black community on numerous subjects helps to expose the diversity of viewpoints 
within the black community, revealing that there is no one black voice.276 His 
performance on the Court and his own words lay a strong foundation for criticizing an 
adherence to traditional merit standards that have worked to exclude many minority 
groups from schools and jobs.277 Even his life experiences as someone who overcame 
extreme poverty and racial stereotyping, both before and after school, stand as an 
example of the systematic social disparity that affirmative action was in part created to 
address.278 
But can the master’s tool really dismantle his house? The answer is rather 
complex. As the late Audre Lorde, renowned feminist and activist, once declared, 
“[The master’s tools] may allow us temporarily to beat him at his own game, but they 
will never enable us to bring about genuine change.”279  
On the one hand, Lorde’s words are fitting because, although Justice Thomas 
can serve as a good argument for affirmative action in numerous contexts, in other 
ways, he fails to make the case, particularly within the context of judicial selections. 
For example, while Justice Thomas brings to the Court a special perspective based on 
his experiences as a black man who endured the segregated South, his voice does not 
introduce the traditionally excluded perspectives of the vast majority of Blacks,280 one 
of the often-cited benefits of diversity on the bench.281 In this sense, Justice Thomas’s 
                                                                                                                                      
275. See Brief Amici, supra note 21, at 98 (“Such consideration of the race of a 
judicial nominee has been beneficial to the Court, not because Justice Thomas has the same 
world view or shares the same judicial orientation as had Justice Marshall. Rather, it is because 
each of them, in his own way, brought or brings to the Court’s adjudication an awareness and 
perspective that is based in part on their experiences as African American individuals.” 
(emphasis added)). 
276. See Sunder, supra note 104, at 497 n.6 (stating that Thomas has been subject to 
“intimidation” used against him for expressing conservative views unpopular with many black 
Americans).  
277. See Guinier, supra note 84, at 186 (noting that Thomas described the University 
of Michigan Law School’s actions in “exceptionalizing diversity and disconnecting it from 
genuine merit [as] problematic”). 
278. See discussion supra Introduction & notes 34–40. 
279. LORDE, supra note 1, at 112. 
280. See Michael deHaven Newsom, Clarence Thomas, Victim? Perhaps, and 
Victimizer? Yes—A Study in Social and Racial Alienation from African-Americans, 48 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 327, 418 (2004) (noting that Justice Thomas’s presence on the Court does not 
allow for a claim “that black people have a representative on the Court, that is to say, a person 
with whom they feel any real sense of community”); see also Ifill, supra note 15, at 415 
(arguing that “[m]inority judicial candidates who are explicitly promoted to fulfill diversity 
objectives . . . must offer more than their racial ‘face’ to demonstrate that they can bring 
diversity to the bench”); cf. Johnson & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 105 (manuscript at 46–50) 
(describing how the appointment of a Latino judge, such as Miguel Estrada, may add to 
diversity and the perception of judicial impartiality but would not further the inclusion of 
perspectives traditionally absent from the judiciary). 
281. See WASHINGTON, supra note 130, at 174. As Judge Henry Bramwell of the 
Eastern District of New York, a black conservative, once stated, “[B]lack judges can articulate 
the problems of the black community. Black federal judges are also needed to combat the 
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presence on the Court arguably accomplishes little in increasing most of the black 
community’s faith in the judicial system and judicial decision-making and certainly 
does less in “representing” the perspective of many Blacks.282 For Blacks who find 
themselves disproportionately entangled in the judicial system283 and in other 
instances dependent on the judicial system’s role in recognizing their basic rights,284 
this form of representation is critical.285  
To say that the vast majority of Blacks now hold no more confidence in 
Justice Thomas’s likelihood of “representing” their views than in some of his white 
colleagues is not an exaggeration.286 Unlike Justice Marshall, who pushed his 
colleagues “to reconcile legal norms with outsider realities,”287 one could argue that 
Justice Thomas does not truly bring an outsider viewpoint or alternative, but solely a 
different (although important) bent on an insider view.288 In fact, many Blacks would 
                                                                                                                                      
prejudice, discrimination, and racism that is deeply rooted in our society.” Id. Judge Bramwell 
was the one black judge to contest the Judge Higginbotham’s criticisms of Thomas. See id. at 
175. 
282. See Johnson, supra note 157, at 5 (acknowledging that “Justice Marshall gave 
voice to the sentiments of many African Americans”). 
283. See CARL T. ROWAN, THE COMING RACE WAR IN AMERICA: A WAKE-UP CALL 
193–94 (1996) (noting that Blacks comprise 50.8 percent of the inmates in our prisons and jails 
and that Blacks are incarcerated at a rate of 1,947 per 100,000 black citizens compared to a rate 
of 306 per 100,000 for white citizens); David Cole, The Paradox of Race and Crime: A 
Comment on Randall Kennedy’s “Politics of Distinction”, 83 GEO. L.J. 2547, 2553–67 (1995) 
(detailing how the criminal justice system is biased both racially and socioeconomically). 
284. See Biskupic, supra note 172 (noting that Professor Stephen Carter of Yale Law 
School has described the Supreme Court as “the ultimate place that black people had been able 
to go to to vindicate their rights”). 
285. See Chen, supra note 78, at 135 (“How can the public have confidence and trust 
in such an institution if it is segregated―if the communities it is supposed to protect are 
excluded from its ranks? A diverse judiciary signals the public acknowledgment of historically 
excluded communities and sends an invaluable message of inclusion. It enhances courts’ 
credibility among affected communities who would otherwise feel they have no voice within 
the institution.” (emphasis added)). This is not to suggest that a Supreme Court Justice serves 
as a representative for any group of people, only to say that such representation of views is one 
of the cited benefits of diversity on the bench. 
286. Cf. John O. Calmore, Airing Dirty Laundry: Disputes Among Privileged 
Blacks—From Clarence Thomas to “The Law School Five”, 46 HOW. L.J. 175, 180 (2003) 
(“[Justice Thomas’s] complicated identity as an African American is challenged constantly. 
Within significant segments of black America, he has been written off. For instance, over the 
last six years, Ebony Magazine has refused to list Justice Thomas among its 100 most 
influential African Americans.”).  
287. Ifill, supra note 15, at 456–57, 484 (stating that Justice Marshall “forced the 
other Justices to confront and address the reality of life for the poor, for women, for African 
Americans, and for other marginalized groups”). 
288. Devon W. Carbado, Race to the Bottom, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1283, 1303 (2002) 
(maintaining that Justice Thomas’s racial and conservative jurisprudence/politics entrenches a 
social arrangement that advantages Whites and disadvantages Blacks in access to social 
resources—education, employment, and housing). Justice Thomas has, however, indicated 
sensitivity to having the law be accessible to people of all socioeconomic classes and education 
levels by expressing his desire to write opinions that persons without a college education can 
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rather leave the fate of civil rights in the hands of Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, 
or Stevens.289 Moreover, as the late Judge Leon Higginbotham once argued, as a 
minority, Justice Thomas’s support of what are perceived as “insider views” on racial 
issues may give “an imprimatur of satisfaction and approval” to such positions.290 In 
this sense, Justice Thomas’s “voice of color” actually presents a danger to the interests 
of many Blacks because his race, in some instances, may lend credibility to his 
positions291 and thus wrongly signify to others that he is representing the interests of 
people whose views are actually in direct opposition to his own.292 
Furthermore, while in some respect Justice Thomas serves as an important 
role model for all people293 (especially given his strong commitment to mentoring and 
speaking before groups of underprivileged black children), in other ways his utility as 
a role model for minority children and young adults may be inadequate.294 As many 
proponents of affirmative action have argued, an important aim of affirmative action is 
the manner in which it helps to remove limitations that minorities may place on career 
aspirations due to lack of representation in any given field.295 Thus, unlike a racially 
diverse student body that may enhance public “confidence in the openness and 
integrity of educational institutions” simply because of the range of diverse 
perspectives among students,296 Justice Thomas’s inclusion on the Court does not 
necessarily advance the benefit of role modeling or a feeling of inclusion for many 
                                                                                                                                      
understand. See Michael A. Fletcher & Kevin Merida, Calling the Reputable, Reliable, Right-
Leaning, WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 2004, at A11. 
289. Cf. Johnson & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 105 (manuscript at 51) (“Many, 
perhaps most, [minorities] . . . would rather have nine [Justice] William Brennans on the 
Supreme Court than nine Clarence Thomases.”). 
290. WASHINGTON, supra note 130, at 5. 
291. See, e.g., Charles, supra note 205 (manuscript at 41–44) (arguing how that 
Justice Thomas held epistemic authority as black man who could uniquely feel the harms of 
cross burning in Virginia v. Black). 
292. See WASHINGTON, supra note 130, at 5; Carbado, supra note 288, at 1303–05. 
293. See WASHINGTON, supra note 130, at 36 (describing the personal experience of 
Judge Veronica MacBeth, a black female judge in California, who stated that “everybody looks 
up to” judges). 
294. See Merida & Fletcher, supra note 1 (stating that Robert Brooks, a Savannah 
radio talk show host who boarded buses from Savannah to Washington, D.C., in support of 
Thomas’s nomination, felt betrayed by Thomas’s record and declared that he did not want 
Thomas “held up as a role model”). But see Richard Delgado, Affirmative Action as a 
Majoritarian Device: Or, Do You Really Want to Be a Role Model?, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1222, 
1226–28 (1991) (describing the problems with the role model argument for affirmative action). 
295. See Jack Greenberg, Diversity, the University, and the World Outside, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 1610, 1620 (2003) (describing how affirmative action can offer “hope to young 
African-Americans that they can escape the ghetto”); Stroud, supra note 2, at 386–92 (arguing 
that affirmative action can “expand people’s sense of what is possible for them, so that they can 
subject the full range of options to the kind of individualized scrutiny that is appropriate to 
career decisions and goals”); see also Edwards, supra note 97, at 329 (asserting that the strong 
presence of black judges serves as an inspiration for minorities who aspire to positions in the 
legal profession); Chen, supra note 78, at 135 (explaining that a diverse judiciary “assures 
students and young lawyers from historically underrepresented communities that they need not 
limit their aspirations”). 
296. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 332 (2003). 
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minorities.297 As many scholars have noted, young individuals from socially 
disadvantaged groups are more likely to have low career aspirations because they do 
not often see people who look like them and share their background in positions of 
high achievement.298 Thus, to the extent that affirmative action assists members of 
certain racial minorities in achieving visible success, it helps to encourage younger 
members of similar groups to strive for success and to convince them that such 
success is attainable.299 However, if the most effective role models are those whom 
children and young adults see as being like them,300 then Justice Thomas does not fit 
the script, because he is viewed by so many Blacks as a traitor to his race301 (although 
perhaps wrongfully).302 In fact, young Blacks with divergent views may wonder, “Do 
I have to think like him to succeed at a similar level? Will I be allowed to advance, 
when deserving, if I do not ‘sell out’ my people?”303 
Finally, Clarence Thomas does not make the case for affirmative action 
because of his beliefs regarding how affirmative action stigmatizes minorities.304 For 
Clarence Thomas, who asserts that he did not benefit from the policy,305 the stigma 
that affirmative action “places on” minorities, especially people who would have 
achieved on their own “merit,” nullifies any benefit that may be gained by greater 
minority or female presence in schools or the workplace.306 To him, the policy renders 
all minorities as second-rate and inferior in the eyes of the majority and only works to 
                                                                                                                                      
297. See Ifill, supra note 15, at 482 (“While Thomas’s backers viewed him as a black 
role model, to many blacks, Thomas was not a role model.”). 
298. See, e.g., Brest & Oshige, supra note 81, at 869 (stating that young members of 
an intractably disadvantaged group often come to believe that “regardless of their efforts, group 
members simply cannot succeed”). 
299. Id. (describing the importance of same-race role models). Cf. Stroud, supra note 
2, at 386–92 (same). 
300. Brest & Oshige, supra note 81, at 875 (describing differing perceptions of racial 
and ethnic identity between two brothers of mixed Irish and Salvadoran heritage—one of them 
being Professor Ian Haney Lopez—and noting how hiring Professor Lopez, who holds a pan-
Latino identity, may benefit members of other Latino groups but hiring his brother who relates 
most easily with his Anglo side would not serve any of the goals of affirmative action). 
301. See Smith, supra note 196, at 513, 529–30 (noting that Thomas has been called 
a “traitor” and that “some of his harshest attacks have come from the civil rights community”). 
302. See Jacquelyn L. Bridgeman, LatCrit IX Symposium, Defining Ourselves for 
Ourselves, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. (forthcoming 2005) (exploring definitions of blackness and 
describing how the use of terms such as “sellout” and “IncogNegro” are damaging to Blacks). 
303. Cf. JOHN U. OGBU, BLACK AMERICAN STUDENTS IN AN AFFLUENT SUBURB: A 
STUDY OF ACADEMIC DISENGAGEMENT 160 (2003) (defining “role model [as] somebody a 
person wants to be like” (emphasis in original). 
304. Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 241 (1995) (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
305. See Classic Example, supra note 6, at 35. 
306. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 373 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (“Beyond the harm the Law School’s racial discrimination visits upon 
its test subjects, no social science has disproved the notion that this discrimination ‘engenders 
attitudes of superiority or, alternatively, provoke[s] resentment among those who believe that 
they have been wronged by the government’s use of race.’”) (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 
241). See generally CARTER, supra note 247, at 4–5, 11, 47–67 (describing the harmful 
emotional effects of affirmative action on himself).  
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perpetuate the myth of minority incompetence.307 Indeed, portions of Justice Thomas’s 
dissent in Grutter almost seemed personal,308 including his complaint that “[w]hen 
blacks take positions in the highest place of government, industry, or academia, it is 
an open question today whether their skin color played a part in their 
advancement.”309 Affirmative action supporters, however, contend that any negatives, 
including stigma, are outweighed by the benefits of the policy.310 Mainly, though, they 
have highlighted the fact that the stigma of racial inferiority was not caused by 
affirmative action, but instead has always existed in American society.311 After all, the 
stigma existed when Blacks were deemed to be three-fifths of a person solely for 
purposes of representation.312 It existed when Justice Harlan, who has been praised by 
many for his lone dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson,313 essentially proclaimed the 
superiority of Whites by saying, “The white race deems itself to be the dominant race 
in this country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth, and 
                                                                                                                                      
307. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 372 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“Who can differentiate between those who belong and those who do not? The majority of 
blacks are admitted to the Law School because of discrimination, and because of this policy all 
are tarred as undeserving. This problem of stigma does not depend on determinacy as to 
whether those stigmatized are actually the ‘beneficiaries’ of racial discrimination. . . . The 
question itself is the stigma—because either racial discrimination did play a role, in which case 
the person may be deemed ‘otherwise unqualified,’ or it did not, in which case asking the 
question itself unfairly marks those blacks who would succeed without discrimination.”). 
308. See Guinier, supra note 84, at 181 (guessing that Justice Thomas perhaps had a 
“personal axe to grind” in Grutter); see also Tushnet, supra note 24, at 338 (“One would have 
to have a completely tin ear not to hear the reference to high places in government as 
identifying Justice Thomas himself.”). 
309. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 373; see also Kearney, supra note 180, at 33. 
310. See Laura M. Padilla, Intersectionality and Positionality: Situating Women of 
Color in the Affirmative Action Dialogue, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 843, 881 (1997) (“Furthermore, 
any stigma-attached downside to affirmative action does not outweigh the upside of providing 
opportunities for women of color that would not otherwise exist.”); see also F. Michael 
Higginbotham, Affirmative Action in the United States and South Africa: Lessons From the 
Other Side, 13 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 187, 209–210 (1999) (arguing that the positives of 
affirmative action outweigh its burdens). See generally Michael Selmi, The Facts of Affirmative 
Action, 85 VA. L. REV. 697 (1999).  
311. See Padilla, supra note 310, at 880 (“Blacks and whites must face the fact that 
affirmative action has made no significant difference in the way whites look at blacks. 
Competent and successful blacks are still seen as exceptional. Before and since affirmative 
action, most white people see another white as competent until proven incompetent and a black 
person as incompetent until proved competent.” (emphasis added)); Patterson, supra note 21, at 
334 (same). See also Guinier, supra note 84, at 186 (asserting that “[e]rroneous assumptions 
about black intellectual inferiority, laziness, and general undeservedness have a long history”). 
312. See Paul Finkelman, Affirmative Action for the Master Class: The Creation of 
the Proslavery Constitution, 32 AKRON L. REV. 423, 428 (1999) (“The three fifths clause 
provided for counting three-fifths of all slaves for purposes of representation in Congress.”). 
313. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). In Plessy, Homer Plessy, who was seven-eighths white and 
one-eighth black, filed a lawsuit, seeking the rights, privileges, and immunity of Whites, after 
he was thrown out of a white railroad passenger car based on race. Id. at 541–42. The Supreme 
Court held that state-mandated racial segregation in railroad passenger cars did not violate the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment so long as the separate facilities were 
equal. See id. at 544, 550–51. 
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in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time.”314 It existed during the 
Jim Crow era,315 and it continues to exist today.316 Supporters further contend that 
such stigma, which is caused by racism,317 is not likely to disappear unless interaction 
across racial lines occurs on a regular basis, with individuals of all races coming to 
learn about and appreciate each other as equals.318 In sum, what is stigmatizing for 
most minorities is not affirmative action,319 but rather beliefs that are rooted in the 
idea of white superiority. Indeed, as one civil rights activist who attended Boalt Hall 
Law under an affirmative action program declared, “‘Stigmatize [us], give [us] that 
degree.’ [It’s not] [a]s though if you don’t have the Berkeley degree you’re not 
stigmatized as a black person.”320  
While Lorde’s words about the inability of the master’s tool to dismantle his 
house are fitting in the sense that Justice Thomas does not advance certain important 
benefits of affirmative action, her words are not fitting when applied to selected 
portions of Justice Thomas’s dissent in Grutter, which can serve as a catalyst for 
instituting true change in society, in particular the admissions processes at schools. 
Just as the words of many liberals have been co-opted by conservatives, including 
Martin Luther King, Jr.’s hope that his children would one day be “judged by the 
content of their character rather than the color of their skin,”321 supporters of 
                                                                                                                                      
314. Id. at 559. 
315. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (noting that racial 
segregation is “usually interpreted as denoting inferiority of the [N]egro group” (internal 
quotations omitted)). 
316. See Frank Rudy Cooper, Cultural Context Matters: Terry’s “Seesaw Effect”, 56 
OKLA. L. REV. 833, 858–59 (2003) (describing how “[p]rejudicial social norms are too 
pervasive and strong for anyone to avoid without effort”). 
317. See Guinier, supra note 84, at 186–87, 190 (describing how racism is linked to 
stigma and helps to explain “why legacy preferences, which account for a larger percentage of 
admissions at selective colleges than do racial or ethnic factors, do not generate the same 
‘stigma’”). Cf. Sturm & Guinier, supra note 107, at 995 & n.183 (stating that legacies account 
for up to twenty-five percent of admissions to top schools). 
318. See Angela Onwuachi-Willig, For Whom Does the Bell Toll: The Bell Tolls for 
Brown?, 103 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 35–36, on file with the Author) 
(asserting that true racial equality can be achieved only through integration that allows persons 
to recognize their shared experiences and interests). 
319. See F. Michael Higginbotham, supra note 310, at 210 (“In the United States, 
few recipients of affirmative action perceive it as stigmatizing.”). 
320. Patterson, supra note 21, at 334. 
321. Many conservatives cite this language when they argue for colorblind policies. 
However, Martin Luther King, Jr. supported the idea of taking race into account. He once 
explained,  
It is impossible to create a formula for the future which does not take into 
account that society has been doing something special against the Negro for 
hundreds of years. How then can he be absorbed into the mainstream of 
American society if we do not do something special for him now, in order 
to balance the equation and equip him to compete on a just and equal basis? 
Brief Amici, supra note 21, at 92. Like Dr. King, Dr. Bill Cosby has made statements, 
specifically comments about lower income Blacks, that have been co-opted by conservatives. 
See, e.g., Today: Armstrong Williams, Syndicated Columnist, and Joe Madison, Radio Talk 
Show Host, Discuss Bill Cosby’s Comments About Needed Responsibility in the Black 
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affirmative action should use Justice Thomas’s “request” for a re-parameterization of 
admissions standards to meet that challenge and establish an in-road to overhauling 
traditional standards that have worked to exclude many minorities and women.322 
Indeed, as many scholars including Professors Derrick Bell and Lani Guinier have 
argued, the short-term push for diversity as opposed to changes in merit standards has 
served only as a distraction in efforts to achieve racial justice because it gives 
“undeserved legitimacy to the heavy reliance on grades and test scores that privilege 
well-to-do, mainly white applicants.”323 In fact, the emphasis on grades and test scores 
conceals less obvious class biases in traditional admissions processes, such as 
expensive test preparation courses, personal tutors, and significant counseling and 
mentoring in private schools.324 Most importantly, the notion that traditional factors 
objectively measure merit hides the fact such standards favor only a small group of 
largely privileged people, with seventy-four percent of students at the 146 most 
selective colleges coming from the upper twenty-five percent of the socioeconomic 
                                                                                                                                      
Community (NBC television broadcast, May 24, 2004) (transcript available at LEXIS, Nexis 
Library, NBC News File); see also Theodore Shaw, Even Cosby Knows There Is More to the 
Story, TOPEKA CAP.-J., June 3, 2004, at A4 (stating that “conservatives are applauding Bill 
Cosby for saying that the problems of the black community stem primarily from personal 
failures and moral shortcomings”). In a speech during a gala commemorating the fiftieth 
anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), Bill Cosby complained 
about “lower economic” Blacks “not holding up their end in this deal.” Among other things, 
Cosby stated, “Brown versus Board of Education is no longer the white person’s problem. 
[Black people] have got to take the neighborhood back. . . . They are standing on the corner and 
they can’t speak English.” George Curry, Bill Cosby Stands Behind Critical Comments, 
ATLANTA DAILY WORLD, May 27, 2004, available at www.zwire.com. 
322. See, e.g., Kidder, supra note 122, at 172–218 (establishing that the LSAT is 
biased against women, people of color, and other outsiders). 
323. Bell, supra note 267, at 1622 (expressing his view that Grutter may not have 
been the victory it was perceived to be); see also Sturm & Guinier, supra note 107, at 957; Lani 
Guinier, Our Preference for the Privileged, BOSTON GLOBE, July 9, 2004, at A13 (“Too many 
universities use their admissions criteria to consolidate privilege rather than expand 
opportunity. . . . Admissions decisions reflect a preoccupation with measures of excellence that 
tell us more about grandparents’ wealth than first-year college grades. . . . It disadvantages 
poor and working-class whites, not just people of color, who may need time to transition 
academically but who graduate and become leaders in their community at higher rates than 
their higher-scoring white counterparts. We should evaluate what students will do after 
graduation, not just during the first year of study.” (emphasis added)). Others, such as Justice 
Thomas, have argued that the focus on diversity harms minorities because it sets them up to 
fail. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 372 (2003) (“These overmatched students take the bait, 
only to find that they cannot succeed in the cauldron of competition.”); see also THOMAS 
SOWELL, RACE AND CULTURE 177 (1994) (“Even if most minority students are able to meet the 
normal standards at the ‘average’ range of colleges and universities, the systematic 
mismatching of minority students begun at the top can mean that such students are generally 
overmatched throughout all levels of higher education.”). 
324. See Guinier, supra note 84, at 148–49 (detailing upper middle-class bias in 
admissions and asserting that “[q]uantative measures often reflect family resources and 
influence rather than a student’s resourcefulness or intelligence”).  
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ladder, only three percent coming from the bottom twenty-five percent, and roughly 
ten percent coming from the bottom fifty percent.325 
Furthermore, as Justice Thomas alluded to in his dissent,326 because the 
benefits flowing from diversity are so great, a rejection of those standards that are 
traditionally used in admissions and in certain jobs327 should not sacrifice the quality 
of schools or businesses. This would prove especially true in the school context if a 
broad base of schools rejected such standards, forcing the extremely influential 
institutions responsible for “ranking” colleges, such as the U.S. News and World 
Report magazine,328 to develop new methods for measuring the quality of schools.329 
In fact, such a broad-based rejection of standardized test scores is brewing at the 
college level at a number of elite undergraduate institutions, including Bowdoin and 
Bates Colleges in Maine, Mount Holyoke College in Massachusetts, and Hamilton 
College in New York.330 Instead of relying so heavily on standardized test scores,331 
                                                                                                                                      
325. Id. at 148 (citing Anthony P. Carnevale & Stephen J. Rose, The Century 
Foundation, Socioeconomic Status, Race/Ethnicity, and Selective College Admissions, Mar. 
2003, at 8, available at http://www.tcf.org/Publications/Education/carnevale_rose.pdf). 
326. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 356 n.4 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
327. Michael Selmi, Testing for Equality: Merit, Efficiency, and the Affirmative 
Action Debate, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1251, 1253–54, 1256–77 (1995) (explicating that 
“employment tests are typically weak predictors of potential productivity and that individual 
test scores are inaccurate measures of an individual’s true abilities as those abilities are 
measured by the examination”). 
328. In 1998, John Sexton, then the Dean of the New York University School of 
Law, led 164 out of 180 ABA-approved law schools in drafting and signing a letter that advised 
law school applicants to conduct individual research on each school and to not rely on the 
rankings from the U.S. News and World Report. See Jorge Fitz-Gibbon, City Has 3 Top Law 
Schools/Rates Nation’s Best, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Feb. 21, 1998, at 4 (describing law schools’ 
criticism of the rankings). According to Sexton, “a ranking system inherently assumes that 
every applicant has identical needs and desires.” Law School Rankings Evoke Defense, BUFF. 
NEWS, Feb. 20, 1998, at A14. See also Guinier, supra note 84, at 145–46 (explaining that the 
“facial neutrality of . . . rankings hides not only their arbitrariness, but also their value choices 
and tendency to perpetuate existing privilege” and that “quantitative measures can be . . . 
misused to hold [institutions] accountable to one-size-fits-all standards that discourage pursuit 
of [their] . . . educational mission”); Robert W. Hillman, The Hidden Costs of Lawyer Mobility: 
Of Law Firms, Law Schools, and the Education of Lawyers, 91 KY. L.J. 299, 310 (2002–2003) 
(contending that “published law school rankings reflect[] a unitary model of legal education by 
measuring the worth of all law schools by reference to the standards of the elite few”). The 
American Association of Law Schools has called for the magazine to stop publishing its 
rankings. See Dana Coleman, Jersey Deans: Enough Already with the Surveys!, N.J. LAW., 
Mar. 9, 1998, at 5 (describing the objection to the rankings by law school deans in New 
Jersey). 
329. See Guinier, supra note 84, at 206 (arguing that situating merit within structures 
of opportunity can encourage schools to focus more on long-term commitments to service and 
community leadership). 
330. See Editorial, A Healthy SAT Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2001, at A14; 391 
Schools That Do Not Use SAT I or ACT Scores for Admitting Substantial Numbers of Students 
into Bachelor Degree Programs, available at www.fairtest.org/optstat.htm#NY. 
331. Students can voluntarily choose to submit their test scores. 
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these schools do not require the submission of SAT or ACT scores, but instead request 
more essays, interviews, and any other information that may help the admissions 
committee in assessing a student’s ability to succeed at the school. These schools have 
decided to ask themselves the difficult questions about how to tailor their processes to 
determine who will actually contribute to the fulfillment of their schools’ missions, 
instead of relying solely on standards that many agree are not perfect predictors for 
success.332 Other schools and businesses should follow suit. In fact, after twenty years 
without the SAT as a requirement for admission, Bates College recently presented 
findings from a study of its students over the same period. As the college reported, 
there was virtually no difference between the academic performance or the graduation 
rate of applicants who had not submitted their SAT scores and those who voluntarily 
did so.333 Specifically, Bates found that, between 1985 to 1999, those who did not 
submit SAT scores earned an average grade point average of 3.06, just slightly lower 
than those who chose to submit SAT scores, who earned an average grade point 
average of 3.11.334 Additionally, Bates found that the graduation rate for those who 
did not submit SAT scores was just slightly higher than for those who chose not to 
submit scores—86.7 percent compared to 86.6 percent.335 Moreover, the school found 
that the SAT-optional policy had helped it not only increase its applicant pool but also 
attract a more diverse student body.336 
In the end, perhaps Justice Thomas has a point, both in his selection to the 
Court and in his “call” to re-parameterize standards of merit—that decision-makers in 
schools and in the workplace should truly explore the range of possibilities available 
for defining merit. What then is the real challenge for supporters of affirmative action 
in the next few years? Supporters should use all the tools available to dismantle the 
“master’s house,” with Justice Clarence Thomas even serving as one of those tools 
“working the right way.”337 
                                                                                                                                      
332. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 324 (2003) (acknowledging that 
applicant’s college grade point average and LSAT score are imperfect “predictors of academic 
success in law school”); see also Chemerinsky, supra note 54, at 1172 (“Undergraduate grades 
and LSAT scores often fail to predict many of the skills needed to succeed in law school and 
especially to excel as an attorney. More importantly, ‘merit’ must include all that makes a 
person deserving of entrance. Because of the importance of diversity, merit often should 
include what a person will add to the education of other students.”); Delgado, supra note 116, 
at 1740–42 (demonstrating how standardized tests, such as the SAT and LSAT, can be 
culturally biased). 
333. See Eric Hoover, Bates Calls Its SAT-Optional Policy a Boon, CHRON. HIGHER 
EDUC., Oct. 15, 2004, at I8.  
334. See id. 
335. See id. 
336. See id. 
337. Classic Example, supra note 6, at 36.  
